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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXIV APRIL, 1939 Number 3
MURDER BY THE CLOCK*
JAMES K. KNUDSONt
I. THE PROBLEM-ONE OF WORDS AND MIND AND MURDER
This article is, in epitome, a protest against the utter unreality
with which courts and legislatures deal with spur-of-the-moment
killings and a plea for a more subjective approach to the whole
theme of homicide. Its problem has never been better posited
than by the late Mr. Justice Cardozo in a lecture before the
Academy of Medicine and now happily available to all in his Law
and Literature. Said the Justice:
Homicide under our statute is classified as murder and as
manslaughter, and murder itself has two degrees, a first and
a second. "The killing of a human being, unless it is excus-
able or justifiable, is murder in the first degree when com-
mitted from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect
the death of the person killed, or of another * * * ." "Such
killing of a human being is murder in the second degree,
when committed with a design to effect the death of the
person killed or of another, but without deliberation and
premeditation." There, you see, is the distinction, and it is
at least verbally clear. Both first and second degree murder
(laying aside any exceptions which I thought it unnecessary
to state) require an intent to kill, but in the one instance it
is deliberate and premeditated intent, and in the other it is
not. * * * The difficulty arises when we try to discover
what is meant by the words deliberate and premeditated.
A long series of decisions, beginning many years ago, has
given to these words a meaning that differs to some extent
from the one revealed upon the surface. To deliberate and
* This article constitutes Chapters IV and V of a more detailed treatment
of the subject prepared as a Criminology treatise for graduate credit under
Professor Sheldon Glueck of Harvard University Law School, 1937.
t A.B., George Washington University, 1934; LL.B., 1934; LL.M., Har-
vard University, 1938. Senior Attorney, Solicitor's Office, United States
Department of Agriculture.
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premeditate within the meaning of the statute, one does not
have to plan the murder days or hours or even minutes in
advance, as where one lies in wait for one's enemy or places
poison in his food or drink. The law does not say that any
particular length of time must intervene between the voli-
tion and the act. The human brain, we are reminded, acts
at times with extraordinary celerity. All that the statute
requires is that the act must not be the result of immediate
or spontaneous impulse. "If there is hesitation or doubt to
be overcome, a choice made as the result of thought, how-
ever short the struggle between the intention and the act,"
there is such deliberation and premeditation as will expose
the offender to the punishment of death. * * *
I think the distinction [between murder in its two de-
grees] is much too vague to be continued in our law. There
can be no intent unless there is a choice, yet by the hypoth-
esis, the choice without more is enough to justify the in-
ference that the intent was deliberate and premeditated.
The presence of a sudden impulse is said to mark the divid-
ing line, but how can an impulse be anything but sudden
when the time for its formation is measured by the lapse of
seconds. Yet the decisions are to the effect that seconds may
be enough. * * * I think the students of the mind should
make it clear to the law-makers that the statute is framed
along the lines of a defective and unreal psychology. If in-
tent is deliberate and premeditated whenever there is choice,
then in truth it is always deliberate and premeditated, since
choice is involved in the hypothesis of the intent. What we
have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the
lesser degree, when the suddenness of the intent, the vehe-
mence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exer-
cise of mercy. I have no objection to giving them this dis-
pensing power, but it should be given to them directly and
not in a mystifying cloud of words. The present distinction
is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can
fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it. * * *
Upon the basis of this fine distinction with its obscure and
mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to their
death. * * *1
Whether Mr. Justice Cardozo restricted the application of his
criticism solely to the law of New York does not clearly appear
from the context. Be that as it may, New York is not the only
jurisdiction where the same problem has raised its head. It ap-
pears in the maelstrom of homicide law in many other jurisdic-
1. Pp. 95-101.
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tions. The courts of Florida, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Wash-
ington, whose murder statutes are drafted after the pattern of
the New York laws, are likewise in a turmoil over the matter2
as are the tribunals and legislatures of states that have codified
the common law rules of murder,, states that have divided mur-
der into degrees to limit the use of the death penalty,4 states that
have abolished the death penalty,5 states where murder is not
divided into degrees,6 states that have left the meaning of first
degree murder to a residuary definition 7 and states where the
crime is not defined, the statutes merely prescribing the penalty
for wilful murder.,
The limited task undertaken in this article is to ascertain, as
objectively as the solemnity, importance, and social utility of the
problem will allow, in the light of statutes and court decisions,
whether there is such a thing as "spur-of-the-moment" intent;
if not, whether all murders committed without "adequate time"
for premeditation or deliberation, whatever that time may be,
should be placed in a separate category, with respect to both the
crime and the punishment, from the murders in the commission
of which the time element was sufficient to allow for the forma-
tion in the mind of a "bona fide" intent to kill. This objective
involves the broader inquiry, viz., whether our whole approach
to the "guilty mind" theory of homicide should not be revised.
The outcome of murder trials in America, of course, depends
in large part upon the interpretation given by courts and juries
to homicide statutes, and in analyzing the cases to which resort
must be had for source material this primary fact has been borne
in mind. However, although particular stress will be laid herein
upon the proclivities of the courts to torture the will of legisla-
2. See Part II, infra, pp. 321-344. For a more extensive review and
analysis of the homicide statutes of the various states than is set forth
herein, see Michael and Weschler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide
(1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 702-720; Note (1880) 18 Am. Dec. 774.
3. E. g., Georgia.
4. E. g., Pennsylvania, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Indiana, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Missouri, Nevada,
New Mexico, New Hampshire, North Carolina, New Jersey, etc.
5. E. g., Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, South Dakota.
6. E. g., Georgia, Illinois, Texas, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Okla-
homa, South Dakota.
7. E. g., Texas.
8. E. g., Louisiana, Kentucky. Statutory references for all these exam-
ples and for the remaining states are set forth in Michael and Weschler's
article, supra, note 3.
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tures, it is recognized that the mere misconstruction of statutes
is but one sore-spot on a problem of much wider significance.
Statutes may be restricted or extended to achieve socially desir-
able results, but such a solution would be tantamount to begging
the question.
A full analysis of the problem is not possible here. This would
require a study of its relation to legal history. Such a study
would indicate that there were ages and places where murderers
were dealt with on a subjective basis, but that as men, influenced
by personal vengeance, the welfare of organized society, philoso-
phy, and theology, grafted successive refinements on to the legal
approach to the treatment of homicides, the law in point became
complex and confusing. The currently espoused objective ap-
proach sprang not from its own ashes, but came as an evil from
Pandora's box, and has afflicted society in the over-all treatment
of its homicides ever since.
Proof of the validity of the subjective approach would also
involve a study of the relationship to law of modern "sciences"
of the mind and "sciences" affecting the social organism itself,
including psychology, psychiatry, psycho-analysis, social psy-
chology, sociology, and economics. Obviously, such a study can-
not be made here. Suffice it to say, however, that it is now safe
for men of the law, who have traditionally discounted the values
to be found in the application to law of such "sciences" to make
intelligent use of the findings of these cognate fields of thought.
Human knowledge is not limited to hornbooks, casebooks, or legal
lore.9
II. A FEW "SLIGHT" CASES OF MURDER
Four states, namely, Florida, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota, have patterned their homicide laws directly or indi-
rectly upon the New York statutes, which Mr. Justice Cardozo
was deploring in the remarks that set the theme for this paper.
Our principal efforts will be directed toward an examination of
9. The original thesis, before taking up actual cases, devotes a chapter
to the history of murder law, endeavoring to ascertain how the law reached
the present state of entanglement, particular emphasis being placed upon
the factor of intent in all of its ramifications. The task of the third chapter
is one of examining the authoritarian bases of modern psychology and re-
lated sciences, insofar as they have established governing or guiding prin-
ciples for subjective analysis of the problem at hand and to try to derive
from such examination a scientific method of approach to the problem in a
field outside the law but definitely allied.
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the time-element cases that have arisen in these four states and
to compare the law they establish with the results reached in
New York. Next, we shall generalize briefly on sample cases and
the statutory situations of other jurisdictions and thus, on the
whole, endeavor to give not only a close-up view for details but
also a more diffuse perspective to show the scope of the doctrine.
A. New York-Courts v. Legislature. Before exploring the
checkered New York situation, it may be well to point out that
a serious reform movement relating to homicide statutes has been
started in that state. Under orders from the governor, a Law
Revision Commission has made an exhaustive study of the his-
tory of New York homicide statutes and decisions and has sub-
mitted a detailed Communication dealing with the existing law
and its ramifications, explaining how the law was developed and
making general suggestions as to its revision.10 An important
section of the Communication takes up the type of cases with
which we are here concerned; and it seems advisable here, in
the interests of time and accuracy, to utilize part of the vast
amount of research done by the commission, acknowledge its
claim to prior exploration of the field, and adopt some of its
findings, commentaries, and conclusions to bolster our own case.
With so much by way of approach to the murder muddle of the
Empire State, let's pull on our boots and wade in.
During the English Colonial history of the state, all positive
law relating to homicide was contained in the Duke of York's
Laws.1 These set forth no systematic or all-inclusive definition
of homicide law but merely prescribed capital punishment in cer-
tain cases, notably, for our purposes, for "any wilful and pre-
meditated murder." Some legislation of minor consequence,
passed immediately after the Revolution, merely assumed the
existence of common law concepts and incorporated such tech-
nical phrases as "wilful killing," "wilful murder of malice pre-
pense," "of malice aforethought," et cetera, as a matter of
course.'2 These statutes singled out for special condemnation
murders by stabbing, poison, and lying in wait, as English acts
had done for generations. Together with the early cases they
10. New York Law Revision Comm'n, Communication Relating to Homi-
cide (1937), hereinafter cited as Communication.
11. 1 N. Y. Col. Laws (1894) 20.
12. See note 44 in Communication.
1939]
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Indicate that English common law relating to homicide was con-
tinued in the Colonies almost undiminished.
Some of the language of the New York cases prior to 1829
shows that the courts even at this early day were beginning to
mill about in the confusion of words that were to have such bane-
ful effect on later New York law. An 1816 court, for instance,
found in a poisoning case that the word "deliberate" was de-
scriptive of intent required for murder and recognized the sig-
nificance of "prior" quarrels, grudges, or threats to show that
the intent had existed. 13 In 1824 the same court, in a decision
the subjective logic of which leans both ways at once, said: "It
is clear, there was no cool, premeditated malice. There may, in-
deed, be murder without long meditation."14 In still another case,
the same court laid objective emphasis on the violence of the
force and the nature of the weapon used, saying that where
there was evidence of violent force and the murder weapon was
an ax, a plea of the suddenness of the affray would be unavail-ing.15
In 1794 Pennsylvania introduced an innovation in homicide
law by dividing murder into degrees 6 so as to mitigate the rigor
of common law punishment with respect to the less reprehensiblq
killings. This departure, together with certain humanitarian in-
fluences which had their happy effect on New York lawmakers,
led to a revision of New York homicide statutes.17 The Revised
Statutes of 1829 distinguished murder from manslaughter upon
.the single principle of the absence or presence of a "design to
effect death." Common law terminology was abandoned, the word
"design" replacing "malice" and the word "premeditated" being
substituted for "aforethought." A killing became murder "when
perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of
the person killed, or of any human being." Theretofore, "intent
to kill had been declared to be the sine qua non of the crime of
murder." 8
13. People v. Selnick (N. Y. Oyer and Terminer 1816) 1 Wheeler's Cr.
Cas. 269.
14. People v. Anderson (N. Y. Oyer and Terminer 1824) 2 Wheeler',
Cr. Cas. 390.
15. People v. Tuhi (N. Y. Oyer and Terminer 1817) 2 Wheeler's Cr.
Cas. 245.
16. Act of April 22, 1794, (1896) 3 Pa. Stats.-at-L. 186.
17. N. Y. Rev. Stats. (1829) p. IV, c. 1.
18. Communication, p. 30.
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The immediate question for the courts to decide was whether
the injection of the word "premeditated" added a further require-
ment, to wit, a requisite condition of mind or a subjective mental
process. The history of the Revised Statutes indicated that the
framers by using the word undoubtedly intended thereby to
recognize that murders committed with intent formed suddenly
were to be distinguished from those where the mental condition
was engendered previous to the homicidal act and retained until
its commission.
The trial courts, however, thought otherwise and held that
"premeditated design" meant merely actual intent to kill, even
though formed at the very instant of killing.19 And the Court
of Appeals stamped its approval on this course of the law in two
important cases in 1851 and 1852, People v. Clark-0 and People
v. Sullivan.2 1 These two cases have not only had an important
bearing on the law in point in New York ever since but have
reached out into other states to entangle their laws. In both
cases, the trial court had charged the jury that if they believed
the fatal blow to have been struck by the prisoner with a design
to effect death, it was murder, even though such design was
formed only on the instant accompanying and causing the act.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that the
word "premeditated" was to be construed literally, that the legis-
lature had so intended in order to mitigate the punishment.
Judge Roosevelt, in a concurring opinion, was especially liberal
in his approach:
The law says that killing without authority, when perpe-
trated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the
19. People v. Mulvey (N. Y. Oyer and Terminer 1851) 2 Edm. Sel. Cas.
246. This case involved a defendant who had been ejected from a saloon for
obstreperous behavior. He took two or three steps, wheeled, and fatally
shot a clerk standing in the doorway. His counsel argued that "premedi-
tated design" meant an intent formed some time before the homicide oc-
curred, but the trial court charged the jury that the statute was not to
be so construed; for if it were, it "would leave a large class of homicides
untouched and unpunished by our law, namely, those cases where the inten-
tion to kill is formed on the instant * * * . Such cases * * * would not
be murder, for want of premeditation to the design and would not be man-
slaughter, because there is present a design to effect death." The jury was
therefore instructed to inquire whether, at the time the shot was fired,
there was a design to effect death then existing, and it would not matter
whether this intent was formed before or after the attempt to eject the
defendant from the premises."
20. (1852) 7 N. Y. 385, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 294.
21. (1852) 7 N. Y. 396.
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person killed, or of any human being is murder. Is then an
intention formed on the instant a premeditated design? Con-
sulting merely the popular conception of language, or even
the dictionaries in general use, we must certainly answer
that it is not. So far from being synonymous, these two
forms of expression are generally employed to convey di-
rectly opposite ideas. * * * The words premeditate and
design both import forethought, careful reflection, deliber-
ately arranged purpose-ideas all involving, in their struc-
tures, the essential element of time. We may not perhaps
be able, in every or any case, to define the precise number
of hours or days; but still there must be time, reasonable
time-time for reflection-time to survey the contemplated
deed in all its bearings and probable results; and to con-
trive and arrange, if so decided, the means and method and
occasion of its deadly accomplishment. How, then, can it
be said, without shocking all our notions of speech, whether
common or cultivated, that an intention to kill, formed on
the instant of striking the fatal blow, is the same as a pre-
meditated design to commit the crime of murder?22
It is to be noticed, however, that even Judge Roosevelt bases his
argument on the meaning of words in "common or cultivated"
speech, and makes no attempt to justify the interpretation in any
subjective manner.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the Supreme Court, was
largely influenced by the fact that the crimes of Clark and Sulli-
van, if not murder, could only be punishable under the definition
of manslaughter in the fourth degree. The court used language
that has been often cited in later cases:
If there be sufficient deliberation to form a design to take
life, and to put that design into execution by destroying life,
there is sufficient deliberation to constitute murder, no mat-
ter whether the design be formed at the instant of striking
the fatal blow or whether it be contemplated for months.
It is enough that the intention precedes the act although that
follows instantly.23
Thus through the seeming failure of the revisers to provide for
homicides committed with intent to kill formulated at the instant
of killing, the word "premeditated" was construed contrary to
all ordinary usage, and the death penalty was inflicted on those
who had killed hurriedly in the heat of passion or in sudden com-
22. (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) 1 Park. Cr. Rep. 347, 358.
23. (1852) 7 N. Y. 385, 394.
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bat regardless of provocation, so long as the intent to kill had
existed. The term "premeditated" lost all significance and be-
comes substantially equivalent to the words "actual intent."24
The New York courts paid scant attention in this early day
to the nature of the mental operations leading to the formation
of an intent to kill. The emotional state of the killer's mind was
given no consideration when it was found that intent was present.
Principal stress was laid on the objective test of mere lapse of
time. Subjective psychological reasoning, however, was begin-
ning to stir in the breasts of some jurists, as is indicated by the
dissenting opinion in a case where the prisoner in a frenzied fit
killed his father-in-law who had accused the former's wife of
unfaithfulness .2 5 One judge in this case insisted that although
premeditated design "may be matured in a minute, as well as in
a day," nevertheless it was necessary to inquire whether the per-
petrator was capable of premeditation, for "premeditation pre-
supposes the consent of the will, without which human actions
cannot be considered culpable." Jealousy, like intoxication, might
pervade the mind "to such a degree as to unsettle the understand-
ing and dethrone the will." It is not difficult to imagine the more
orthodox judges looking disdainfully down their noses at such
judicial heresy.
The harsh construction of the courts given to the Revised
Statutes of 1829 led the New York Legislature in 1860 to reform
radically the definition of murder, by dividing it into two de-
grees.2 6 The manifest intention was to remove from the category
of capital offenses the kind of homicides typified by the Clark
and Sullivan cases. Not only was the word "premeditated" used
to describe murder in the first degree, but the words "deliberate"
and "wilful" as well. But the legislature overlooked the fact that
these latter words had taken on a cargo of fixed meanings in
their tortuous course through the alien seas of the common law,
from which the New York courts would be loath to depart.
This attempt to reach a new result by combining in one
definition a collection of outworn words, the component
parts of which had been beaten into meaninglessness by cen-
turies of ritualistic-like repetition, is a striking commentary
24. Communication, p. 37.
25. People v. Sanchez (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1859) 18 How. Pr. 72, 4 Park.
Cr. Rep. 535.
26. N. Y. Laws of 1860, c. 410.
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upon the difficulty of using descriptive language to prescribe
murderous intent of the highest degree.27
The courts ran true to form. In 1862, a case came before the
courts involving a slaying committed by a man who was being
pursued by his assailant." The trial court instructed "that if a
man, being pursued by another, turns upon him, and wilfully,
deliberately, and premeditatedly kills him, he is guilty of murder
in the first degree; and it is a matter of no consequence whether
he deliberates one minute or one hour, whether he premeditates
one minute or one hour, whether he forms that design one min-
ute or one hour before." The Supreme Court approved without
comment.
The 1860 statute was repealed in 1862, and the legislature re-
verted to the terminology of the original Revised Statutes in the
use of the phrase "premeditated design to effect the death" with
certain innovations.29 The definition of murder in the original
Revised Statutes now became murder in the first degree except
that the general felony murder provision was excluded, and a
specific provision solely for arson felony murder was substituted.
Second degree murder was given a negative, residuary defini-
tion, designed obviously to cover intentional homicides with ex-
tenuating circumstances.
Yet there was perplexity in the legal profession as to the exact
meaning of this statute.30 Indeed the courts continued to give
instructions in terms of the rule of the Clark and Sullivan cases
to the effect that even if the intent to kill were formed on the
instant of the killing, the crime would be murder in the first de-
gree; and these instructions were approved. The trial court in
the O'Brien case,31 for instance, had declared:
If there be sufficient deliberation to form a design to take
life, and to put that design into execution by destroying life,
there is sufficient deliberation to constitute murder, no mat-
ter whether the design be formed at the instant of striking
the fatal blow or whether it be contemplated for months.
27. Communication, p. 41.
28. Jefferds v. People (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) 5 Park. Cr. Rep. 522.
29. N. Y. Laws of 1862, c. 196.
30. See, e. g., People v. Waltz (N. Y. Oyer and Terminer 1874) 50 How.
Pr. 204.
31. O'Brien v. People (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1867) 48 Barb. 274, aff'd (1867)
36 N. Y. 276, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 368. See also McKee v. People (1867)
36 N. Y. 113, 34 How. Pr. 230; People v. Lewis (N. Y. Ct. of App. 1867)
41 How. Pr. 508, 3 Abb. Dec. 535; People v. Thompson (1869) 41 N. Y. 1.
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The General Term affirmed this definition even though it was
shown that it was taken from a case handed down before the
enactment of the 1862 statute ;32 and the Court of Appeals ex-
pressly approved the charge of the trial court.
Again, the good intentions of the legislators were in a measure
defeated by their own clumsy draftsmanship but, in the main,
by the frozen attitude of the courts toward any attempt to take
such words as "premeditated design to kill" from the incrusted
frame of the past and give them new and deserving meaning.
It is odd that the legislators did not give up in disgust, but
public opinion was apparently making manifest a feeling that
something drastic should be done to separate "homicides" which
were morally less reprehensible, in that they evinced a lesser
degree of "wilfulness" or "deliberation" than first degree mur-
ders. The lawmakers therefore in 1873 provided with respect to
intentional homicides that:
Such killing, unless it be manslaughter or excusable or jus-
tifiable homicide, as hereinafter provided, shall be murder
in the first degree, in the following cases: First, when per-
petrated from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect
the death of the person killed, or of any human being. * * *
Such killing unless it be murder in the first degree, or man-
slaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, as herein-
after provided, shall be murder in the second degree when
perpetrated intentionally but without deliberation and pre-
meditation."
Two years later a trial court definitely recognized that this
legislation "made a wide moral difference" between "deliberated"
and sudden killings.34 In 1881 the legislature wrote the final
chapter in the rectification of the statutes by making a slight
rephrasing of the second degree murder definition. 35 The prin-
cipal question now for the courts to decide was whether the ad-
dition of the word "deliberate" to "premeditated," which had
been found of itself inadequate, would give the first degree mur-
der definition the solo part that had so long been sought for it.
Those interested had not long to wait to ascertain the first
reaction of a court that hitherto had riddled the intent of the
32. N. Y. Laws of 1862, c. 196, cited supra, note 29.
33. N. Y. Laws of 1873, c. 644.
34. People v. Batting (N. Y. Oyer and Terminer 1875) 49 How. Pr. 392.
35. N. Y. Penal Code (1881) sec. 184.
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legislature. It was declared, in the case of People v. Walworth,0
in 1873 that the legislature had "effected" a substantial change
in the law of murder under which something more than the actual
presence of intention formed at the instant of striking of the
blow or firing of the shot was necessary to constitute first degree
murder. It must appear that there was actual deliberation and
premeditation operating upon the mind of the accused in respect
to the subject matter of the offense.
"Deliberation" thus meant more than a mere limitation on
time. It connoted a rational process in which the mind weighed
and considered alternate courses of conduct, finally making a
choice to kill. "Premeditation" meant that such rational process
had to occur before the act. Thus this court, for perhaps the
first time, made a conscious effort to be subjective in its reason-
ing. The Supreme Court at first indorsed this position of the
trial court, declaring in Leighton v. People7 that rash or hasty
execution of intent was no longer allowed to be sufficient; that
the execution of the guilty purpose was to be determined upon
reflection, before the crime of murder in the first degree could
be committed.
It may be recalled that the common law had taken a strictly
objective view with respect to the question as to what mental
processes were necessary to identify the accused as a murderer
in the first degree. Subjective approaches had been rarely at-
tempted and by the majority of courts looked upon as entirely
abandoned. The early cases under the Penal Code of 1881 indi-
cated that there was a desire on the part of the New York courts
to take a subjective approach to the matter of intent. Two opin-
ions of the Court of Appeals88 indicated that it had been per-
suaded by this line of earthy reasoning, the court going so far
in the second of the two cases as to declare that premeditation
and deliberation signify an intent springing from the reasoning
powers of the brain rather than from the impulse of the moment.
Indeed, as if to repent in earnest of its former ways, the Ap-
peals Court leaned over backwards subjectively and said, in a
case where defendant, being jilted and mocked by her faithless
36. (Oyer and Terminer 1873) 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 355.
37. (1882) 88 N. Y. 117.
38. People v. Hawkins (1888) 109 N. Y. 408, 17 N. E. 371; People v.
Jackson (1909) 196 N. Y. 357, 89 N. E. 924.
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paramour when she pleaded with him to marry her, hurried
home, got a razor, returned, and slit his throat:
Deliberation and premeditation imply the capacity at the
time to think and reflect, sufficient volition to make a choice,
and by the use of these powers, to refrain from doing a
wrongful act. * * * If, at the moment, in consequence of
what he said to her and the final culmination of the alleged
wrongs of which she conceived herself to have been the vic-
tim, she became incapable of reasoning or of deliberating,
the act, we think, would not constitute murder in the first
degree.3 9
And in a case 4 0 where deceased struck defendant, who pulled
his gun and snapped it several times before it went off, killing
deceased, the court, by a bare majority however, recognized that
from beginning to end the episode took but one or two minutes
and that the defendant's mind might have been in such condition
that he could not deliberate. In People v. Caruso1 the Appeals
Court again took the position that only where the killer's mind
has engaged in a process of reasoning leading to the decision to
do the fatal act had a "deliberate and premeditated design to kill"
existed.
It is pointed out in the Communication of the Law Revision
Commission, however, that in all these cases "The question upon
which guilt was made to turn was: did overwhelming emotion
in fact overcome the defendant's mind and drive him to kill?
Immaterial was the question: should he under the facts of this
kind of a case have been so overcome by emotion that by an un-
reasoned impulse he was driven to kill?"42 This state of affairs
indicated that, although the court took a more subjective ap-
proach than it had been theretofore wont to do, it had not wholly
divorced itself from common law concepts of cooling time, pro-
vocation, emotion, et cetera, so as to be able to consider the purely
psychic aspects of such cases. In requiring that the actual state
of mind of the offender and all the influences bearing upon the
mental condition be taken into account, the high court was merely
giving the logical implications of the policy underlying the 1873
and 1881 statutes their due effect. In the absence of psychologi-
39. People v. Barberri (1896) 49 N. Y. 256, 43 N. E. 635, 52 Am. St.
Rep. 717 (italics supplied).
40. People v. Fiorentino (1910) 197 N. Y. 560, 91 N. E. 195.
41. (1927) 246 N. Y. 437, 159 N. E. 390.
42. Communication, p. 58.
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cal data on which to base conclusions as to each slayer's frame
of mind, the courts resorted principally to the evidence of prepa-
ration to commit the crime to prove a reasoned determination to
kill free from driving impulse0 3
Furthermore, in their anxiety to emphasize the time element,
which had been so completely repudiated in the Clark and Sulli-
van cases, the courts were laying a foundation for a further
development. In the Majone case" the court sanctioned an in-
struction to the effect that "design must precede the killing by
some appreciable space of time. But the time need not be long,"
for "the human mind acts with celerity which is sometimes im-
possible to measure." Here was the handwriting on the wall, and
to the perceiving it meant that deep down in the mind of the
court there was stirring, unconsciously or subconsciously, a de-
sire to return to the rule of the Clark and Sullivan cases, even
if the return were made in the guise of a fictionalized formula.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find the Court of Appeals, as
early as 1884, declaring in People v. Conroy" that:
To infer the existence of deliberation and premeditation does
not require the lapse of any special period of time. * * *
The shortness of time elapsing between the conception of
the intention and its execution form no legal defense of the
crime. * * * It required mental effort to realize that he had a
pistol, to contemplate its use, and to appreciate the existence
of a cause for its production at that time.4
By 1887 the court was ready to recognize that a five second
interval was sufficient to justify the finding of deliberation and
premeditation, even where the circumstances indicated height-
ened provocation and mental unbalance.47 Of course, there was
caustic protest on the part of some judges to this reversal of
form. Learned, P. J., for instance, chided the court in terms of
its own mechanics, pointing out that "an opinion of the court
"shaking mad" to shift a shot gun to his left hand and with
his right draw a revolver from a pocket ;32 the interval between
43. See People v. Lewis (1889) 115 N. Y. 663, 21 N. E. 1062; People
v. Sliney (1893) 137 N. Y. 570, 33 N. E. 150; People v. Hamilton (1893)
137 N. Y. 531, 32 N. E. 1071; People v. Rohl (1893) 138 N. Y. 616, 33
N. E. 933; People v. Scott (1897) 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028; People v.
Pekarz (1906) 185 N. Y. 470, 78 N. E. 294.
44. (1883) 91 N. Y. 211, 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 94.
45. (1884) 97 N. Y. 62, 2 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 566.
46. 97 N. Y. at 79.
47. People v. Schuyler (1887) 106 N. Y. 298, 12 N. E. 783.
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the argument and the decision would hardly be called a deliber-
ate and premeditated opinion."' ' But such protests were futile
to dam the flood of cases that thereafter adopted the rule of the
Majone, Conroy, Clark, and Sullivan trials, which had empha-
sized the brevity and the objectivity of temporal element.
The courts in rapid succession found the following intervals
sufficient to indicate that the defendant had time to consider the
nature of his act: "from half a minute to two minutes," while
defendant was holding a pistol in his hand ;49 "a space of about
three minutes," the time necessary to choke a person to death ;5
"a matter of seconds"; 51 the time it took defendant who was
"shaking mad" to "shift a shot gun to his left hand and with
his right draw a revolver from a pocket" ;52 the interval between
shots fired in rapid succession ;13 or the time that elapsed between
the first and sixth effort to fire a revolver, the second, third,
fourth, and fifth attempts being misfires.5 4 The case that capped
the climax, however, was People v. Jackson5s where the court
affirmed a conviction based on the charge:
But the time that elapses which shows deliberation need not
be a day. It need not be a minute. It may be a second, or a
fraction of it. It must be time enough so that reasons arise
for not doing the act thought of, and so that the mind makes
its choice and decides to do that which was done.56
The inconsistency of such reasoning is apparent in the light not
only of psychology" but also of the vaunted logic of the law. The
subjective approach that characterized the Caruso and Fioren-
tino cases was totally disregarded, and the will of the legislature
to ameliorate the treatment of homicides that arose out of un-
48. People v. Beckwith (1887) 45 Hun 422, 428, 10 N. Y. St. Rep. 97.
49. People v. Constantino (1897) 153 N. Y. 24, 47 N. E. 37.
50. People v. Pullerson (1899) 159 N. Y. 339, 53 N. E. 1119.
51. People v. Ferraro (1900) 161 N. Y. 365, 55 N. E. 931.
52. People v. Rodawald (1904) 177 N. Y. 408, 70 N. E. 1.
53. People v. White (1903) 176 N. Y. 331, 68 N. E. 630; People v. Jones
(1909) 194 N. Y. 83, 86 N. E. 810.
54. People v. Harris (1913) 209 N. Y. 70, 102 N. E. 546.
55. (1909) 196 N. Y. 357, 89 N. E. 924.
56. 89 N. E. at 925.
57. No matter by what brand of psychology one elects to test the sub-jective shortcomings of such an approach to the problem of guilt or inno-
cence in a homicide case, the result is the same. Behaviorism, determinism,
Freudian psychoanalysis, psychology based on instinct, reflex action, or emo-
tion-all argue against the proposition that choice and reflection, or to put
the matter legalistically-premeditation, deliberation, and intent, are mat-
ters of instantaneous mental reaction.
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settled and irrational conduct was set at naught. Many extra
cases were thereby brought under the first degree murder pro-
vision and, to return to Mr. Justice Cardozo's lament: "Upon the
basis of this fine distinction with its obscure and mystifying
psychology, scores of men [went] to their death."2 8
The court continued to drift farther away from any subjective
approach to the problem by computing the nature of the intent
from the actual physical manifestations exhibited by the result
produced, disregarding even proof of the most obvious mental
conditions that bear on the functions of intent. In Sindram v.
People 9 the court declared, for instance, that
* * * evidence that the prisoner had an irascible temper or
was subject to fits of passion from slight causes was not
admissible. * * * If his acts were such as to satisfy the jury
that the killing was with premeditation and deliberation, his
bad temper or eccentricities of character, not amounting to
insanity, could not detract from the effect of his acts, or
shield him from responsibility therefor.60
In People v. Cain,61 a more pronounced case of obviously upset
mentality, the court reached a similar result. The defendant, a
negro, became embroiled in an argument with two white pas-
sengers on an elevated train. The three disembarked together,
and one of the white men made a pass at the negro, who drew
a knife and ran toward the street. The defendant's antagonists
disappeared into a crowd. Several people attempted to stop the
negro; a shot rang out; the negro ran amuck in the crowd swing-
ing his knife wildly. Nine persons were stabbed, three died. At
the trial the district attorney admitted that the negro was insane.
Although the train of events was sufficient to unbalance even a
normal person, the court affirmed a conviction of first degree
murder, being impressed with the admission of the district at-
torney, but holding that defendant knew right from wrong and
knew the nature and quality of his acts.
These are the New York cases to date.6 2 Hereafter we shall
have occasion to comment on the possible statutory cure for the
ailment of the New York law and to compare such a cure with
58. Supra, p. 306.
59. (1882) 88 N. Y. 196.
60. 88 N. Y. at 199, 200.
61. (1912) 206 N. Y. 202, 99 N. E. 566.
62. See also People v. Zackowitz (1930) 254 N. Y. 192, 172 N. E. 466.
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other possible remedies. Until then, we shall leave New York
and move into the legal family circle of the other states.
Bad parents beget bad children. This is no less true in the
law than in eugenics. The New York murder laws are the par-
ents of similar statutes in several other states. We should, there-
fore, take a passing glance at the offspring to see whether their
environment has, in any measure, overcome their heredity.
B. Orthodox Florida Justice and Jumping Florida Justices.
One of the early cases in Florida of the type that elicits our
interest is Ernest v. State.6 3 The victim was apparently cut
on the neck by a razor in the hands of defendant. Deceased,
however, did not perish from the immediate effects of the wounds
but from tetanus which set in afterward. Defendant was con-
victed of murder and based an appeal upon on allegedly errone-
ous charge to the jury that, on the subject of malice or a pre-
meditated design, when a killing is proved, the law presumes that
it was done with premeditated design unless it shall appear from
the evidence, either on the part of the defense or the State, that
there was excuse or justification. In commenting on the context
of this charge the Florida Supreme Court said:
* * * we think [this clause] is clearly error. The word
"malice" is not found in our statutes relating to homicide.
Premeditation is defined as meaning intent before the act,
but not necessarily an intent existing any extended time be-fore the act. "Premeditated design," as used in the statute,
means an intention to kill, design means intent and both
words imply premeditation." * * * "The question of pre-
meditation is one of fact, like all other facts, to be deter-
mined by the jury."6
63. (1883) 20 Fla. 383.
64. 20 Fla. at 388-389. Italics are supplied. The Florida statute reads
as follows: "See. 7137. Murder. The unlawful killing of a human being,
when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed or any human being, or when committed in the perpetration
of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary,
shall be murder in the first degree, and shall be punishable by death. When
perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a
depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any design to
effect the death of any particular individual, it shall be murder in the sec-
ond degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the prison for life,
or for any number of years not less than 20 years. When perpetrated with-
out any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of
any felony, other than arson, rape, robbery or burglary, it shall be murder
in the third degree and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State
prison not exceeding twenty years." Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (1927). The
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It is evident from this case that the Florida courts took a run-
ning start on the road of unreality, following the adoption of
their new statute. Although refusing to let the lower court "get
away" with instructions that would confuse "malice" with "pre-
meditated design," the high court itself indulged in a logomachy
that defies rational interpretation; and, in the use of the phrase
"but not necessarily an intent existing any extended time before
the act," opened the door invitingly, as the New York court did
in the Leighton and Majone cases, to the concept of spur-of-the-
moment intent in its most deplorable form.
It has been observed that the unwillingness of modern courts
to accept psychological data is out of tune with the willingness
of courts in the past to allow medical testimony to be read into
the record, regardless of the then relatively undeveloped state
of medical science.65 The instant case is a perfect illustration of
this point and again shows the inconsistency of the 1883 court in
approaching medical forensics realistically but denying the same
approach to the psychic elements of the case. Of course, the an-
swer is that the court felt that it knew something about tetanus,
whereas it perhaps had never heard of psychology. The signifi-
cant thing is that the medical evidence accepted is all out of
kilter with present knowledge of the subject; just as psychologi-
cal testimony today may be out of adjustment with the knowl-
edge developed in that field in the future. But the court accepted
the medical knowledge.
In 1886, about the time the New York Appeals Court was
putting the skids under judicial realism in applying its murder
statutes,66 the Florida Supreme Court was wrestling with Carter
Florida statute, according to Hocker, J., in Cook v. State (1903) 46 Fla.
20, 39, 35 So. 665, "borrowed the phrase 'premeditated design' from the New
York statutes," although Wisconsin had a similar law. Carter, P. J., in-
sisted that the Florida statute is a literal transcript of the Wisconsin
statute. Reference to the section on Wisconsin cases, infra p. 339, will indi-
cate that Wisconsin looked to New York for statutory inspiration.
65. Accredited schools have been offering well patronized courses in
psychology and its sister sciences for several years. There are habit clinics,juvenile courts, probation offices, penitentiaries, asylums, delinquincy clinics,
employment agencies, and various other institutions throughout the land
utilizing the services of trained psychologists. It is safe to assert that the
science is much more developed than was medical science when the courts
first began to rely on its expert testimony and guidance in criminal cases.
Why then is the law so loath to make changes in its substantive structure
based on the psychological facts at hand?
66. See note 47, supra, and text supported thereby.
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v. State.6 7 A city ordinance prohibited blocking the sidewalk.
Deceased, a policeman, warned a negro standing near a saloon
against violating this ordinance and told him to be gone. An-
other negro came from the saloon and counseled the first negro
to stand his ground. The deceased returned and commanded both
to move. Defendant refused and deceased poked him in the ribs
with his police stick. There was an exchange of words, and the
defendant went into the saloon and emerged again in about a
minute. The deceased told him that if he didn't move on, he
would "put him away." Defendant refused, with an oath, and
deceased struck him on the elbow and again on the head. De-
fendant drew a revolver and killed deceased. On appeal, counsel
for the defense argued that there was no proof of premeditation,
and that the time intervening between the commencement of the
altercation and the killing was too short to allow of prisoner's
forming a design to effect the death of the deceased. To this,
the appeal court replied:
The law does not prescribe what length of time should
intervene between the formation of the design by one to
effect the death of another and the execution of such design.
All that it requires is that there be such an interval of time
between the intent and the act as will repel the presumption
that it was done upon a sudden impulse conceived and exe-
cuted almost instantaneously, or that its execution followed
so quickly after the design as to show that the mind was not
fully conscious of its own intention. If there is an intent to
kill, an interval of time sufficiently long for the prisoner to
be fully conscious of what he intends, and then an execution
of such intent, it is sufficient to convict the prisoner of mur-
der in the first degree. These are all questions of fact for thejury.6 8
Considering the fact that the defendant was a colored person
accused of murder in the deep South, the language of this court
is surprisingly liberal. On the other hand, the temporal element
is made so elastic by the court as to be almost meaningless, and
the case therefore falls in the same category, so far as develop-
ment in the law is concerned, as Ernest v. State.
This half-way position in the law was not to be long sustained,
67. (1886) 22 Fla. 553.
68. 22 Fla. at 558. The court here relied on Commonwealth v. Drum(1868) 58 Pa. 9, 16, an early case under Pennsylvania murder statutes,
which were the first to divide murder into degrees.
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however, for in 1892 came Lovett v. State.69 Deceased owed de-
fendant, a negro boy, fifty cents. Defendant, who had been target
practicing in the woods with his pistol, went to the home of
deceased to collect. Deceased met defendant at the door and
threw him off the steps. Defendant ran from the yard and with
an oath dared deceased to come out. Deceased, a large, powerful
man, started menacingly toward defendant, who fatally shot him.
The following syllabus by the court explains the nature of the
defendant's appeal, following conviction of murder, with respect
to the element of premeditation, and the court's reaction thereto:
It is not erroneous to charge that the premeditation which
the law requires to constitute murder in the first degree need
not be for any particular length of time; that it is sufficient
if the premeditation was but for a moment, provided the
action of the slayer was the result of such premeditation.
The use of the word "moment" does not imply less time than
was necessary for deliberating upon the subject of killing
and forming a distinct design or determination to kill, of
which defendant was fully conscious before firing the fatal
shot.7
0
Cook v. State7' was the battle-ground for one of the most re-
vealing word battles in the history of American homicide cases.
The defense was that the accused was too intoxicated to form a
premeditated design to kill. The trial judge, inter alia, gave the
following charge:
* * * If the mind of the accused was in a condition to form
a purpose, and there was sufficient time for the forming of
that purpose, and for the mind to be conscious of that pur-
pose to kill, it is sufficient time to constitute premeditation,
and if the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that the defendant had fully formed a purpose
to shoot and kill Smith, and that he was conscious of that
purpose when he fired the shot, they will find the defendant
guilty of murder in the first degree.72
Hocker and Shactdeford, JJ., and Taylor, C. J., thought the
charge an improper definition of premeditated design. Carter,
P. J., and Maxwell and Cockrell, 33., dissented. The court being
equally divided, the question presented in the charge was not
69. (1892) 30 Fla. 142, 11 So. 550, 3 judges dissenting.
70. Italics supplied.
71. (1903) 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 665.
72. 35 So. at 671.
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decided. The affirmative opinion by Hocker relied on Sullivan v.
People, which, it will be recalled, declared in effect that the in-
tention of the New York legislature in revising the murder
statutes was to rule out the possibility of putting spur-of-the-
moment killings in a first degree murder category. Hocker saw
no difficulty in the fact that the New York Court of Appeals over-
ruled the Sullivan case in People v. Clark,73 for, he reasoned, the
fact that the legislature, being dissatisfied with this decision,
again amended the statute indicated the way in which it should
have been construed even before amendment. In a closely knit
and convincing opinion, invoking leading decisions from several
other states, he demonstrated that "premeditated" has a literal
meaning of its own as well as a legislative intent behind it and
is not to be construed away by technical interpretation.
Carter, P. J., on the other hand, insisted that the court was
bound by the definitions of premeditation in the Ernest, Carter,
and Lovett cases, bolstered by Olds v. State,7 4 and that with
reference to New York the Clark case was controlling. The fact
that the legislature more than twenty years after this decision
amended the state should not, he thought, influence Florida to
place a different construction on its statute, for the Florida legis-
lature had reenacted it without adding anything to the definition
-an indication that it was entirely satisfied with definitions
taken from the New York decisions before the statute was
amended there75
People v. MajoneO8 and People v. Conroy77 were to the dis-
senters the guiding lights, for, they reasoned, these cases were
decided even after the New York statute had been amended so
as to include both the words "deliberate" and "premeditated" as
modifiers of "design"; and, if the court could hold in the teeth
of such an amendment that the time for reflection need not be
long and that it was enough that the intention precede the act,
although that follow immediately, it must necessarily be that the
doctrine of the earlier cases in Florida was sound and unim-
peachable. The truth is that the dissenters did not have the
73. (1851) 7 N. Y. 385. For all of these cases refer back to the previ-
ous section dealing with New York statutes and cases.
74. (1902) 44 Fla. 452.
75. See 46 Fla. at 66, 67, 35 So. at 681.
76. (1883) 91 N. Y. 211, cited supra, note 44.
77. (1884) 97 N. Y. 82, cited supra, note 45.
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stamina to depart from tradition. Their attitude, and the atti-
tude of courts throughout the land on this issue, is epitomized
in the final paragraph of Judge Carter's opinion:
The charges criticised in the present case are sustained
by our previous decisions, and I do not understand that this
fact is seriously questioned. In order to hold them erroneous
we must overrule the uniform decisions of this court for
nearly a quarter of a century construing "premeditated de-
sign" and disregard the rule of construction appertaining to
reenacted statutes. We must disregard and declare to be
erroneous the decisions rendered in the only States that have
statutes like ours. We must interpret into our statutes the
words "wilful and deliberate," which to my mind is judicial
legislation pure and simple, and depart from our conserva-
tism by disregarding and setting at naught our own deci-
sions as well as the weight of authority in States where
those words are made by statute part of the definition, for
by the great weight of authority there the charges under
consideration are correct. I am willing to assume this re-
sponsibility, and thereby unsettle the law of homicide in this
State as understood for nearly a quarter of a century.7s
1906 found the Florida court still divided on the question.
Two new judges who had been appointed split in their views.
It is surprising that Shackleford, who had become Chief Justice,
departed from his views in the Cook case and voted with the dis-
senters in 1906. Apparently the reasoning of the dissenters in
Cook v. State had even more than its desired effect, however, for
we find in the case of Keigans v. State"r a trial judge giving this
charge to the jury:
The premeditated design to kill may have existed in the
mind of the slayer for a month, a week, a day or an hour,
or may have been formed a moment before the fatal shot
was fired. * * * If you believe defendant shot and killed
* ** , it would make no difference at what precise time he
made up his mind * * * . If, when he fired the pistol he
intended to kill he is guilty of murder in the first degree,
even though he may not have had in his mind any such in-
tention at the time he drew his pistol8o
Judge Parkhill's opinion attacking this charge pointed out that
as a whole it went a step further "in whittling away and short-
78. Cook v. State (1903) 46 Fla. 20, 77, 35 So. 665, 685.
79. (1906) 52 Fla. 57, 41 So. 886.
80. 41 So. at 886.
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ening the time in which the defendant must have formed a pre-
meditated design to kill," and that if the words "if at the time
he fired the fatal shot he intended to kill" were taken literally,
the charge did away entirely with the requirement of the law
that there must be such an interval of time between the intent
and the act as will repel the presumption that it was done upon
a sudden impulse conceived and executed almost instantaneously.
He deplored the fact that such a charge permitted the defendant
to be convicted of murder in the first degree upon proof of in-
stantaneous or "flashlight premeditation." Surprisingly, he cited
People v. Maone to support his contention just as the dissenters
had done to support their views in the Cook case.
1907 found the court still divided and the opponents of "flash-
light" intent seeing vice in an instruction defining premeditation
"as meaning intent before the act but not necessarily an intent
existing any extended time before the act."8 The dissenters did
not consider the charge "ideal" but found it not to be "seriously
objectionable." Thus the court sat back and mused about the
stalemate it had played itself into. The fulminations of the court
had centered around the temporal element, but Cockrell, one of
the dissenters, came as close to recognizing the subjective psychic
aspects of such a case as any of the several justices on either
side had done in the long dispute, when he timidly admitted that
No distinct and conscious intent to kill a human being can
be formed by the average man of ordinary intelligence and
perception without some premeditation, and as a general
proposition in the domain of mind study, I can see no flaw
in it. If the peculiarities of the mentality of the slayer at the
time of the homicide call for an exception to this general
proposition, it may be given in a separate charge; but this
exception does not destroy the general rule.8 2
The deadlock was broken in 1908 when Parkhill, J., "went
over to the enemy." Barnhill v. State8" furnished the motif for
Parkhill's departure. The victim in this case passed defendant's
store and gave vent to a vigorous oath addressed either to a cow
on the sidewalk or to defendant's wife. Defendant emerged and
reproached deceased but not in an angry tone. Deceased there-
upon called defendant a vile name and threatened him, where-
81. Stokes v. State (1907) 54 Fla. 109, 44 So. 759.
82. 44 So. at 765.
83. (1908) 56 Fla. 16, 48 So. 251.
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upon the two started a fight. Deceased drew a knife and with-
out opening it hit defendent over the head several times, drawing
blood. Deceased asked a bystander for his gun to kill defendant.
The two then separated. Deceased threatened to get a gun from
a nearby store and kill defendant. Defendant, knowing that a
rifle was kept at the store, got his shot gun and within five or
six minutes was pointing it at deceased who stood knife in hand
at the counter of the store from which he had threatened to get
a gun. Defendant testified that he knew deceased would get him
unless he shot first. The defense contended that there was not
a sufficient interval passed between the fight and the slaying to
allow for a formation of premeditated design within the mean-
ing of the statute and so pleaded on appeal, following imposition
of the death sentence. But Parkhill, J., thought that the circum-
stances, plus the fact that defendant had at least six minutes to
cogitate, were sufficient to warrant sending him to his doom; and
the fact that two justices believed that the time "was too short
for defendant to have become so cool as to be able to form a
premeditated design" was not sufficient to save him.
The same result was reached in 1915 in Wise v. State,8"' which
case saw one of the two remaining stalwarts jump the fence
into the camp of the majority. The extent to which the corrosion
was acting upon the court is apparent when the facts of the case
are considered. Prisoner and deceased were drinking when a
sudden quarrel was precipitated. Prisoner commanded deceased
to leave the house, and deceased struck accused on the head with
a whiskey bottle, then ran. Prisoner followed deceased and
fatally cut him on the neck and back. Here were facts that would
have justified the court in taking Judge Cockrell's advice" and
in giving heed to the peculiarities of the mentality of a drunken
mind. But the court, led by Chief Justice Taylor, disregarded any
subjective considerations and found the orthodox temporal ele-
ment quite sufficient to take care of the exigencies of the case.
Miller v. State 5 a found the court divided three to two on the
question of premeditation (with Taylor, C. J., back on the right
side of the fence and, strange to say, with the majority of the
84. (1915) 69 Fla. 260, 67 So. 871.
85. Stokes v. State (1907) 54 Fla. 109, 44 So. 759, 765, cited supra, note
82.
85a. (1918) 75 Fla. 136, 77 So. 669.
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court with him). In this case, although the opinion went off on
another track, the court held that where a man, accused of mur-
der, was suddenly confronted by two armed men sent to watch
for him, and fired a gun, killing one of them, he was not guilty
of murder in the first degree. There was found no evidence that
the defendant premeditated the design to kill the deceased, nor
that he had any intention an instant before the fatal shot was
fired to kill the deceased.
In 1925 a particularly revolting case 6 came before the court,
involving a sex slaying of a white woman by a negro. The court
hewed to the line of the Ernest, Carter, and Lovett cases in the
matter of premeditation. The case is only interesting as an addi-
tion to our theme in that the Florida court, for the first time
in such a case, gave psychology passing notice-but what notice!
Said the court: "All psychological investigation shows that the
process of mental conception lies beyond the scrutiny of exact
observation."87
1927 found two new judges standing against the court and
refusing to find sufficient time for premeditation in Powell v.
State,88 where the accused, in a fight with three assailants on the
east side of the street, took refuge in his car, turned it around,
and fired the fatal shot from the west side of the street at the
menacingly approaching trio. In this case and another, Green v.
State, 9 Chief Justice Ellis, who had indicated a contrary state
of mind in the Miller case, voted with the proponents of the
orthodox view, which justified a finding of ample time for pre-
meditation on the facts involved in the Powell case; and in the
Green case even Justice Brown, one of the two faithful in the
Powell case, went over to the majority.
The last ten years in Florida have witnessed no material abro-
gation of the rule first announced in Ernest v. State.0 In Bucha-
nan v. State,91 involving the slaying of two revenue officers, Ellis,
C. J., again flatly declared it to be unnecessary that the intention
should have been conceived for any particular period of time. In
86. Lowe v. State (1925) 90 Fla. 255, 105 So. 829.
87. 105 So. at 831, the court citing Wharton, Criminal Law (11th ed.
1912) for this scientific generalization.
88. (1927) 93 Fla. 756, 112 So. 608.
89. (1927) 93 Fla. 1076, 113 So. 121.
90. See especially Hasty v. State (1935) 120 Fla. 269, 162 So. 910.
91. (1928) 95 Fla. 301, 116 So. 275.
19391
Washington University Open Scholarship
330 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
Wooten v. State92 the defendant, who was driving a car, drove
under a fallen tree and caused deceased, who was riding the run-
ning board, to exclaim, "That's right; wreck it." Thereupon de-
fendant seized a pistol and, saying, "I'll kill you," fatally shot
the rider. The unanimous court declared that the force of de-
fendant's exclamation showed "premeditated design" to kill, with-
out reference to the time factor. The court did not even pause
to consider that mere words may not be conclusive indices of
thought.
The last case to be cited from Florida, Forehand v. State,03
leaves a modicum of hope that the court has in its nature an ele-
ment of judicial realism. The two Forehand brothers engaged
in a fracas with some C. C. C. boys near a rural drink and dance
hall. One of the brothers used a knife in the fray, and both were
later taken in custody by the deceased, a deputy sheriff. The
accused, Pleas, struck deceased in the face, and deceased replied
with a blow from his blackjack. A struggle ensued between the
brothers, the sheriff, and a fourth man. Lannie Forehand se-
cured the blackjack and attempted to strike the sheriff. The two
grappled and fell. The accused seized the sheriff's pistol and fired
five shots at the two men on the ground, killing both of them.
The court cited all of the standard cases, but did not let the
matter rest on these decisions. Instead it took a definite subjec-
tive step forward. Said Ellis, J.:
As the element of premeditation is an essential ingredient
of the crime of murder in the first degree, it is necessary
that the fact of premeditation uninfluenced or uncontrolled
by a dominating passion sufficient to obscure the reason
based upon an adequate provocation must be established be-
yond a reasonable doubt before it can be said that the ac-
cused was guilty of murder in the first degree as defined by
our statute. * * *
The fact that one of those persons was the brother of the
accused and was in the danger of being struck by a bullet
from the pistol in the hands of the accused seems to us to
indicate the presence of a blind and unreasoning passion
which momentarily obscured the reason of the accused and
displaced any capacity to form a premeditated design to kill
Pledger.94
92. (1932) 104 Fla. 597, 140 So. 474.
93. (1936) 126 Fla. 464, 171 So. 241.
94. 171 So. at 243, 244.
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Thus we leave Florida courts, realistically speaking, not much
better than we found them but with the assurance that the "lego-
athletic" propensities of the judges may sometime stimulate a
majority of them to vault into the higher realms of subjectivity
and there, with a psychology book in one hand, a stop watch in
the other, and the milk of human kindness in their hearts, learn
a lesson in law that is not to be discovered in the tomes of the
ancients nor the confused opinions of a New York judicial hier-
archy.
C. Washington Judges Watch the Clock. It is now surely no
surprise to discover that the corrosive influences that ate away
the apparent humanitarian intent of the legislators in New York
and Florida also made their appearance in Washington, although
under the earliest homicide statutes in Washington 5 murder in
the first degree was changed to killing done purposely and of
"deliberate and premeditated malice," and in the second degree
retained the purposive element minus the elements of premedi-
tation and deliberation.
We are early told that the liberalizing statutory definitions in
Washington were meant by the framers to take the place of "the
old definition of murder, viz., the unlawful killing of any sub-
ject whatsoever through malice aforethought."'96 Accordingly the
Supreme Court of Washington, in Rutten v. State, 7 the first case
giving rise to the time element question, held erroneous an in-
struction declaring that "there need not be any appreciable space
of time between the formation of intention and the killing. They
may be as instantaneous as the successive thoughts of the mind."
Said the court:
While no great amount of time necessarily intervenes be-
tween the intention to kill and the act of killing, yet under
our statute there must be time to deliberate, and no delibera-
tion can be instantaneous. * * * Deliberation means to weigh
in the mind, to consider the reasons for and against, and
consider maturely, to reflect upon,-and while it may be
difficult to determine just how short a time it will require for
the mind to deliberate, yet if any effect is to be given to the
statute which makes a difference between murder in the first
95. Wash. Terr. Code (1881) secs. 786, 790; see Leonard v. Territory of
Washington (1885) 2 Wash. Terr. Rep. 381; Wash. Penal Code (1891) secs.
1, 3.
9. Rutten v. State (1895) 13 Wash. 203.
97. Ibid.
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and second degree, the language [of the instruction] is too
broad."8
It is evident from this case that the Washington court, as the
Florida and New York courts had done before, strove at first to
follow the letter of the statutory definition. But it, too, found
the departure from common law concepts, as they had come to
be understood, a difficult one to make.
Indeed a case 9 to confirm this assertion came within two years.
The facts are not recorded, but apparently the time element with
reference to premeditation was involved. The court deftly re-
called the precise words of the objectionable instruction in State
v. Rutten and then drew this subtle distinction:
The instruction in the case at bar provides for an appreci-
able space of time, viz., a moment, and this is a moment of
time before the doing of the act. It is true, that a moment
is the smallest division of an appreciable space of time, but
it is a division, and an appreciable one, and this qualification
removed the instructions from the objections commented
upon in the case above referred to [the Rutten case].9°a
As matters stood in 1900, therefore, an instantaneous intent
was adjudged impossible and frowned upon, but a momentary
intent had the approval of the court. As was largely true of the
other states we have noted, there was no attempt to view the
problem subjectively. The temporal element was the sole cri-
terion. Washington courts looked at the clock; but the clock
turned out only abstract time, and no one knew in Washington
in 1900 whether it took a man one tick or sixty tocks to formu-
late an intent to kill.
Eight years after the turn of the century the court was con-
fronted with a case"0 in which defendant had quarreled with his
wife the day before and on the morning of the shooting. They
separated, and defendant procured a pistol, made a trip of two
miles in returning to his wife, drew his revolver while holding
her, and shot her when she broke and ran away. The jury was
instructed that there need be no particular length of time be-
tween the formation of the intention to kill and the killing, if
98. 13 Wash. at 212.
99. State v. Gin Pon (1897) 16 Wash. 425, 47 Pac. 961.
99a. 47 Pac. at 963. The rule of the Gin Pon case was reiterated in
State v. Hawkins (1900) 23 Wash. 289, 63 Pac. 258.
100. State v. Bridgham (1908) 51 Wash. 18, 97 Pac. 1096.
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the act of killing be preceded by a concurrence of will, delibera-
tion, and premeditation on the part of the slayer. Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and appealed.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the instruction, reminded
defendant that in State v. Straub"'" it had declared that "any
conviction or intention that enters into the mind of man enters
with the rapidity of thought" and had held the Rutten case in-
struction bad because it had said that the intention might be
formed and its execution carried out in the same or successive
instants. The instant case was saved from the fate of the Rutten
case because the instruction recognized that there must be deliber-
ation and time therefor, but that no definite standard as to lapse
of time need be set up. The expression that there need be no
particular length of time was explained as meaning merely that
no fixed or definite time is necessary. Obviously, the court was
influenced by the hideous nature of the crime and was seeking
a way out of the dilemma it had worked itself into by its pri-
marily weak approach to the problem.
In 1909 the state of Washington adopted a criminal code. Its
framers "lifted from the code of New York the sections defining
murder in the first and second degree and manslaughter,"'10 2 ex-
cept that the Washington Code provision contained only the word
"premeditated" as a modifier of "design,"'103 whereas the New
York law, as will be recalled, included both the words "premedi-
tated" and "deliberate." It is to be noted, also, that the framers
of the Washington Code failed to follow the prior definition of
their own statutes in its inclusion of the term "deliberate."
Whereas the New York legislators had thought it advisable to
add the term "deliberate" to give stronger expression of legis-
lative intent to the statute, the Washington law makers, for some
reason not explained by the cases, thought the inclusion of the
word unnecessary.
One of the first cases that came before the court after the
adoption of the Criminal Code with its New York provision, was
State v. Blane,1"4 where the accused had given the son of de-
ceased liquor from a bottle. Deceased resented this, took the bot-
101. (1896) 16 Wash. 111, 47 Pac. 227. See also State v. Arata (1909)
56 Wash. 185, 105 Pac. 227.
102. State v. Palmer (1918) 104 Wash. 396, 399, 176 Pac. 547.
103. Wash. Rem. Comp. Stats. (1922) sec. 2392.
104. (1911) 64 Wash. 122, 116 Pac. 660.
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tle from the accused in a scuffle, and attacked accused with it.
Prisoner drew a pistol and shot deceased. The trial court was
not influenced by the fact that a new murder statute had come
into being but promptly gave the old instruction, that "no par-
ticular space of time need intervene between the formation of
the intent to kill and the killing." This instruction was ascribed
as error by defendant on appeal. The court talked about cases
under the old statutes and thereon based an affirmation of the
orthodox instruction without even the saving grace of a dissent.
The last two cases we shall tarry upon in Washington involve
facts that would have warranted the court in making a subjec-
tive inquiry into the mental condition of the slayer as of the time
of the killing; but the court, in keeping with its time-telling tra-
dition, despite the fact that Washington universities were turn-
ing out trained psychologists by the score who could have been
consulted, looked to the temporal aspects of the cases only and,
being, no doubt, largely influenced by the facts, sent two more
first degree murderers down the last mile.
In State v. Adamo 05 defendant and deceased had engaged in
an extended quarrel during which threats of death had been made
by deceased. On the day of the homicide defendant was escorted
by deceased as he came from a wholesale house. There was an
exchange of heated words, and deceased attempted to lay hands
on defendant as he again entered the wholesale warehouse. When
defendant emerged the second time, he was, according to some
evidence, threatened again by deceased, whereupon defendant
drew his revolver and fired at deceased. Deceased then attacked
defendant, and defendant fired the fatal shots. Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder. In his appeal he complained of
the court's instruction to the jury concerning premeditated de-
sign, to the effect that if defendant shot deceased with the inten-
tion of killing him, and if this intention was thought about or
considered by him beforehand, then there was premeditation, a
moment's reflection being sufficient. This instruction was upheld
on appeal.
In State v. Gaines,-0 the evidence indicated that defendant in
a drunken rage had strangled his victim into insensibility, had
then gone to a nearby garbage dump, procured a stone, returned,
105. (1924) 128 Wash. 419, 223 Pac. 9.
106. (1927) 144 Wash. 446, 258 Pac. 508.
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and inflicted mortal wounds. Following a conviction of first de-
gree murder carrying a death penalty, defendant appealed, alleg-
ing that his instruction to the effect that there was no evidence
of premeditation in the case and that defendant could not there-
fore be found guilty of murder in the first degree had been er-
roneously disallowed. The Supreme Court sustained the disal-
lowance, saying that choking takes some appreciable time, and
that it could not be held that, under the facts and circumstances
of the case, there was no evidence from which the jury could
find premeditation.
Thus we leave Washington, having gained the impression that
whereas in New York is is well-nigh impossible to give a satis-
factory and intelligent charge to a jury involving the time ele-
ment, in Washington it is a relatively simple matter under the
same kind of statutes, because the Washington courts are not
fighting with their legislators over the humanitarian factors in-
volved, and because Washington courts and Washington lawyers
have apparently not yet discovered, as have New York and Flor-
ida judges and lawyers, that in such cases there is a human sub-
jective element as well as a temporal objective one. When they
make this discovery, we can expect trouble but also reform in
Washington.
D. Minnesota Wavers on the Threshold of Realism, Then Walks
Out. In 1862 Minnesota enacted homicide statutes0 7 patterned
to a large extent, as far as first degree murder was concerned,
on the Revised Statutes of New York of 1829.,1 Killing "per-
petrated with a premeditated design to effect the death of * * *
any human being" was murder in the first degree; killing in the
heat of passion upon sudden provocation or sudden combat in-
tentionally, but without premeditation, was manslaughter. Un-
der the obvious force and intention of this statute, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota early declared that the words "intentionally"
and "with premeditated design" in the foregoing provisions were
not synonymous expressions, "the latter involving a greater de-
gree of forethought than the former."'0 9 The Minnesota legis-
lature had shown more foresight than the New York lawmakers
as far as the manslaughter clause was concerned, for the New
107. Minn. Laws of 1862, c. 14.
108. See note 17, supra.
109. State v. Brown (1867) 12 Minn. 538.
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York law made no provision for "intentional" slayings under its
manslaughter rules.
The Minnesota court as early as 1868 injected a commendable
semi-subjective approach into its reasoning process by declaring
that:
It is the province of the Court to define what will consti-
tute a provocation, by, in substance, informing the jury
that it must be something, the natural tendency of which
would be to disturb and obscure the reason to an extent
which might render the average man of fair mind and aver-
age disposition liable to act rashly or without due delibera-
tion or reflection, and from passion, rather than from judg-
ment, and something which the jury are satisfied did so
disturb and obscure the reason of the defendant in the case
before them, so that the homicide was the result of the pro-
vocation." o
Now to ascertain whether these early travels along the road
of realism were continued.
In 1878, for some reason not revealed by the cases, but infer-
entially because of the wide spread between the first degree mur-
der provision and the second degree manslaughter clause, which
allowed many morally more reprehensible homicides than the
term manslaughter connotes to escape fitting punishment, the
legislature amended the law. First degree murder was left as it
had been. Second degree murder, embracing cases where there
was design to kill but without premeditation or deliberation, was
added to the statute, and manslaughter was taken out of the in-
tentional homicide classification.-, In short, the new statute was
designed very much on the order of the New York Penal Code of
1881.112
A case, involving the time element, in which a most extraor-
dinary charge had been given to the jury, came before the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1889.18 The defendant in the
case was a fugitive from arrest in another town. He had gone
to a dance hall about midnight and while there saw two police-
men who he suspected were waiting an opportunity to arrest
him. He approached them and ordered them downstairs at the
point of his revolver. The trio had moved some distance up the
110. State v. Hoyt (1868) 13 Minn. 132, 147.
111. Minn. Gen. Stats. (1878) c. 94.
112. See note 35, supra, and text supported thereby.
113. State v. Thos. Brown (1889) 41 Minn. 319, 43 N. W. 69.
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street, when a third policeman approached from the side or rear.
When he got within thirty feet, defendant turned and shot him
fatally before exchanging shots with one of the others. No words
passed between defendant and deceased. Defendant was appar-
ently calm when he fired the fatal shot. On these facts the jury
were instructed in part as follows:
By the use of the word "deliberation" in the statute the idea
is conveyed that the perpetrator weighed the motive for
the act and its consequences, the nature of the crime or other
things connected with his intention, with a view to a deci-
sion thereon; that he considered all these and that the act
is not suddenly committed. There is no prescribed time for
either premeditation or deliberation. * * * this of course
depends upon the activeness of the mind of the perpetrator.
You have seen the defendant upon the stand, and you canjudge somewhat of the activity of his mind from the manner
in which he testified. [If he debated the question of killing
in his mind for any length of time, even an instant, and as
a result of such debate determined the question and acted
upon the determination thus made, he is guilty of murder
in the first degree.] 111
The possibility of a jury judging the actions of a defendant's
mind at the time and place of the murder from his manner of
testimony in the witness box involves such an enormous psy-
chological non-sequitur as to be deserving of no further elucida-
tion. The temporal element of the charge was also extreme. Note
particularly the phrases "no matter how short the struggle" and
"for any length of time, even an instant." But the Supreme
Court of the state of Minnesota put its judicial sanction on this
charge! The court avoided the subjective part of the charge but
became subjective upon its own account in a way that will bear
repetition. Said the court:
There is great difference in the character of men in respect
to habits of thought and action, as well as to self-restraint
and sense of moral obligation; and persons who have be-
come depraved through evil habits and associations are gen-
erally reckless of restraint, and ripe for crime. Such men
will hesitate but little to commit desperate acts, and will act
quickly under slight temptation, and from motives which
would fail to influence others. We cannot measure the celer-
ity of mental processes and whether in a case of homicide
114. 41 Minn. at 320 (bracketed portions appear in the report).
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a premeditated design to kill was formed, must, where the
question can arise at all, be left to the jury to determine
from all the circumstances. And we think this question was
fairly submitted to the jury in this case.115
A possibility ignored by the court was that lack of "self-re-
straint or sense of moral obligation" may be an index of a men-
tality so hair-triggered, flighty, or purposeless as to plunge one
headlong into a desperate deed without being led there through
all of the mental processes incident to the forming of an intent.
On the time-element phases, the court reasoned that the words
"in an instant" must be considered in the connection in which
they are used, and the sentence objected to as a whole clearly
implied to the court that there must be sufficient time for the
operation of those mental processes in which the judgment is to
be exercised and the purpose definitely formed.
The next case of any significance in Minnesota, so far as our
problem is concerned, is State v. Proow.1 1 6 Prolow was ap-
proached by a drunken bully in a saloon, who threatened to
knock him down. The crowd encouraged a fight, and Prolow was
made to feel inferior and cowardly by their remarks. The pro-
prietor of the saloon intervened and castigated Prolow for start-
ing the brawl, when in fact Prolow was but an innocent by-
stander. Prolow left the saloon, purchased a pistol "to shoot some
dogs," returned to the saloon, and quarreled with the proprietor
over the previous scene. The proprietor took Prolow chokingly
by the neck and threw him bodily from the saloon. Prolow fired
four shots into the proprietor, as he turned to re-enter the saloon,
with fatal results. Prolow, convicted of first degree murder,
complained in vain of the charge to the jury that "premedita-
tion" does not mean calm and deliberate revolving of a proposi-
tion in the mind. Premeditation might be formed at any time,
a moment or instant before the killing. The intention of killing
and the act of killing might be as instantaneous as the successive
thoughts of the mind. Or, so the lower court was allowed to say.
This case, to all intents and purposes, wiped out the distinction
between first and second degree murder that the legislature had
created in Minnesota just as similar cases had done in New York.
As a matter of fact, the Minnesota court in the instant case relied
115. Id. at 323, 43 N. W. at 69.
116. (1906) 98 Minn. 459, 108 N. W. 873.
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in part on People v. Beekwith,117 one of the cases that contributed
to the downfall of the legislative intent in the juggled history of
the New York homicide statutes.
The depth of objectivity into which the Minnesota court sank
after several bold attempts to take a more rational view is illus-
trated in the final case of our Minnesota research, State v. Wor-
mack.118 Deceased in this case, while drunk, quarreled with de-
fendant in her home and then left. Later she returned and re-
newed the dispute with defendant, standing just outside de-
fendant's door. Defendant, provoked, opened the door and shot
deceased. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and
her appeal raised the question of the existence of a premeditated
design to effect death. The Supreme Court justified the verdict
in this language:
The offense may be found to be of this grade from the mere
fact and circumstances of the killing, and where there are
no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption the
law will presume that the unlawful act was intentional and
malicious and was prompted and determined by the ordinary
and natural operations of the mind. * * * The law will not,
therefore, attempt to lay down a more "specific" rule. It
cannot define the length of time within which the determina-
tion to murder or commit the unlawful act resulting from
death must be formed.119
Thus Minnesota has gone the way of other states that have
"lifted" their murder laws from New York's box of Pandora.
The one blessing discoverable in the Minnesota situation is that
Mr. Justice Cardozo's ghastly reminder that "scores of men have
gone to their death" upon the basis of the "fine distinction" of
the statutes "with its mystifying psychology" has less opportu-
nity to be realized in Minnesota than in New York, because
Minnesota has abolished the death penalty. But the illogicality
of the situation as here analyzed remains.
E. Wisconsin--A Study in Unrealized Realism. There remains
for consideration, as one of the states having murder statutes
similar to those that have caused such distress in New York and,
to a lesser degree, wherever else they have been adopted, the
117. (1886) 103 N. Y. 360, 8 N. E. 662.
118. (1921) 150 Minn. 249, 184 N. W. 970.
119. Ibid., quoting and citing State v. Thos. Brown (1889) 41 Minn. 319,
43 N. W. 69.
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state of Wisconsin. Prior to 1849 in Wisconsin, it was necessary
in order to constitute murder under the common law as inter-
preted by Wisconsin courts that the homicide be committed "with
some degree of deliberation and intelligence, and with the in-
tention of doing some great bodily harm.1120 In 1849, however,
the Wisconsin legislature, looking toward the east, thought it
saw a great light in the New York Revised Statutes of 1830
relating to homicide and, with certain modifications, adopted
them.121
Twenty-five years later, in Hogan v. State,'12 2 which determined
the law on spur-of-the-moment killings in Wisconsin and is fol-
lowed to this day, the learned judge was led to remark:
From this statute of New York, ours was taken in 1849. But
it was taken with so vital a difference, that it cannot be
properly said that it was copied. * * * And indeed, there
seems to be a strong presumption that, borrowing the lan-
guage of the New York statute, the legislature of this State
took it in a sense of its own, different from the sense in
which it seems to have been used in New York. * * * This
is an additional reason why we should not follow the con-
struction of the New York courts, if, in our view we can
find a different construction, satisfactory to us, and more
harmonious with the legislative purpose in the distribution
of the crime into degrees. 2 3
Having pointed out the intrinsic difficulties of his task of con-
struing the Wisconsin statute, the judge decided that the words
"premeditated design to effect death" in the definitions of murder
in the first and second degrees signified merely an intent to kill
and did not exclude a sudden intent. This result, of course, de-
feated any humanitarian intention that the Wisconsin legislature
might have had in enacting the statute. That the New York
legislators did in fact have such a purpose was admitted by the
Wisconsin court itself. But the court simply took the attitude
that the Wisconsin statute was poorly drafted and did not ex-
press that intention, and that such an interpretation as given was
justified accordingly. 24
120. Rowan v. State (1872) 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559.
121. Wis. Rev. Stats. (1849) c. 164, sec. 2.
122. (1874) 36 Wis. 226.
123. 36 Wis. at 240-241.
124. A frontal attack on the logic of the Wisconsin court here is con-
tained in the opinion of Hocker, J., in Cook v. State (1903) 46 Fla. 20, 35
So. 665. Quoting: "Undoubtedly the 'design' mentioned in all the sections
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Hogan v. State was cited to justify the approval of the follow-
ing charge to the jury in Roman v. State:
No matter what the provocation; no matter what the heat
of passion, no matter if there were any previous assaults;
no matter what the other surrounding circumstances may
have been: unless the act was justifiable, if there was a
premeditated design to produce death, it is murder in the
first degree.125
The court saw no error in this charge, it being clear from the
whole that by the provocation and heat of passion here spoken
of were meant such as were not incompatible with the forma-
tion in the mind of the accused of a deliberate premeditated de-
sign to kill. This charge hits a new low in realism. There is an
uttter disregard for any subjective factors that well up naturally
out of passion and provocation to becloud the mind in its func-
tions.
In Clifford v. State 26 the court, saying in one breath that "A
premeditated killing is murder in the first degree and can be
nothing else, because it implies the lying in wait, and malice
aforethought, and settled design," in the other indorsed a charge
to the effect that "the wilful intent, premeditation or delibera-
tion need not exist for any particular length of time before the
crime is committed." And when we stop to examine the facts
in the case, the inconsistency becomes even more marked. De-
fendant and deceased had quarreled in the lobby of a hotel over
of the statute is 'premeditated design' and where 'design' is used without
the qualifying word 'premeditated' that word is understood. Any other con-
struction would make a senseless jumble of the statute. But if the 'design'
mentioned in all sections of the statute is 'premeditated design,' how, in
the name of reason, does it follow that it can in any section, and especially
in the one defining murder in the first degree, be anything less than 'pre-
meditated design'? And yet that is the plain doctrine of the opinion of
Hogan v. State. In other words, when under a rhetorical figure a part is
used to signify the whole, then the whole only means what a part of the
whole means. And it is by this reasoning that the phrase 'premeditated
design' was emasculated, so as to mean only design, or intent, without
qualification. It is impossible for us, try as we may, to gain the consent
of our judzment to such reasoning or its consequences. We believe it to be
an unqualified violation of the essential laws of deduction. For a whole is
always equal to, and never less than the sum of its parts; and conversely
a part is never equal to a whole, though under the rhetorical figure of
synecdoche, a part may be put for the whole, or the whole for a part,
and when so used a part always signifies the whole and no less than the
whole." 35 qo. at 674-675.
125. (1877) 41 Wis. 312, 314.
126. (1883) 58 Wis. 477, 486, 17 N. W. 304.
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a gambling debt. Defendant under considerable excitement
started upstairs to bed. Deceased followed him and insisted on
his returning and settling the debt. A friend intervened. De-
fendant drew a pistol, fired twice into the floor, and then, when
deceased grappled with him, fired the fatal shots. To speak in
terms of "lying in wait" under such facts is to forget and pervert
the ancient and accepted meaning of that term.
An attempt to break away from the doctrine of the Hogan case
in Terrill v. State127 drew a sharp dissent. The killing here arose
out of a continuous and hectic physical struggle between several
men in a bar room, following upon a night of drinking and
quarreling. When the fight reached a climax, deceased attacked
defendant, who had asked deceased before not to hit him; and
defendant, being no match physically, drew a revolver and shot
deceased. The trial court charged the jury, in part, that
if you are convinced * * * that when [defendant] shot * **
he did so pursuant to an intent then distinctly formed in his
mind to kill * * *, you cannot lawfully find defendant guilty
of manslaughter in the second degree; for the defendant, in
such a case if he killed from a premeditated design to kill,
is guilty of murder in the first degree. 128
The supreme court, in language which they said was not con-
trary to Hogan v. State, held that the charge was erroneous in
that it failed to distinguish between the intentional and unneces-
sary killing under the statutes and a killing perpetrated by pre-
meditated design to effect the death of the person killed. The
dissenting judge, a perfect personification of arch-objectivity in
the law, declared:
If there is any branch of the law where the doctrine of stare
decisis should be more rigidly maintained than any other, it
is in respect to criminal law, and particularly in regard to
the law of criminal homicide. To carefully and effectually
distinguish between the different degrees of felonious homi-
cide is at best not free from difficulty, and certainly such
difficulty should not be increased by new distinctions, having
the effect to overrule or cast doubt upon the settled law as
it has heretofore been, understood in this state for a quarter
of a century, and in New York, from whence our statutes,
prescribing the degrees of felonious homicide were adopted.120
127. (1897) 95 Wis. 276, 287, 70 N. W. 356.
128. 70 N. W. at 360 (italics supplied).
129. Id. at 361.
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Such reasoning epitomizes the view that spells backwardness
in the law. It forbids a departure from traditional cases even
though manifestly wrong and fails to see in human psychology
any elements that will respond to the whip of passion and provo-
cation so as to distort the normal mental processes. It is against
this very type of reasoning that this paper inveighs. As to abro-
gating the rule of stare decisis in criminal cases, reference might
be made, inter alia., to Bishop, who deplores the fact that some
courts have mutilated the statutory definition of homicide by
construction and vigorously contends that such decisions should
not be regarded as stare decisis.13
The same result as that of the Terrill case was reached in
Sullivan v. State.'1 The valiant stand of the Wisconsin court
to liberalize the law, however, was doomed to fail. The forces
that molded the law in Florida, New York, Washington, and
Minnesota had "put their finger" on the rule of the Terrill and
Sullivan cases and grievously wounded it in the dissenting opin-
ions to those cases. The court as a whole fired what it deemed
to be the coup de grace in Perugi v. State,"32 one year later. The
official reporter thus summarized the result:
Every homicide, not justifiable or excusable, perpetrated in
pursuance of a previous intention to kill distinctly formed
in the slayer's mind, is murder in the first degree, even
though the killing follows instantly the formation of such
intention. Terrill v. State, 95 Wis. 276, and Sullivan v. State,
100 Wis. 283, insofar as they conflict with this doctrine, are
expressly overruled.233
Here again the court relied upon New York decisions but was
careful to cite only those in its favor. Under the spell of the
resuscitated rule of the Perugi case, the court found no difficulty
in holding in Miller v. State,"' in the words of the syllabus, that:
In a prosecution for murder, uncontradicted evidence that
during a quarrel between the deceased and the defendant,
the latter was pushed down stairs, [he had been beaten with
a hammer also by deceased] and that he immediately went
around the house, procured an ax, returned with it to the
second story, and struck deceased, inflicting a mortal wound,
130. Bishop, Criminal Procedure (3d ed. 1880) secs. 571 to 587.
131. (1898) 100 Wis. 283, 75 N. W. 956, Marshall, J., again dissenting.
132. (1899) 104 Wis. 230, 80 N. W. 593.
133. 104 Wis. at 231.
134. (1900) 106 Wis. 156, 81 N. W. 1020.
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shows ample time and opportunity for the formation of the
premeditated design to kill, which is necessary to murder in
the first degree.135
So far as can be ascertained, the rule of the Hogan, Perugi,
and Miller cases is the rule in Wisconsin today.13 Only twice-
in the Terrill and Sullivan cases-were there attempts by the
Wisconsin court to rise above its own source, New York, in the
matter of judicial realism, and these were so feeble that the first
puff of dissent blew them to high heaven.
F. A Bird's-Eye View of the Rule in Other States. The ques-
tion must have arisen in the mind of the reader as to whether
the problem we are exploring is common only to those states
that have homicide statutes patterned after the New York laws.
To jump directly to the answer, it may be briefly stated that the
problem, so far as the cases investigated reveal, rears its head
in every state, no matter what the nature or type of the positive
laws regarding murder may be. There are, to be sure, differences
in the degree to which courts hew to the line of objectivity and
orthodoxy relative to such cases. And there are frequent exam-
ples, such as we have cited above, where dissenting judges have
seen the light, or where the court as a whole has been forced to
face the opposition stubbornly with its back to the wall. But by
and large the doctrine has taken universal root and persisted in
its unrealistic growth.1" A bird's-eye view of the rule in other
states may be gained by examining a few sample cases.
" Missouri statutes, after the manner of Pennsylvania, define
murder in the first degree as "willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated killing." 18 Under this statute Missouri courts have held
that "if the slayer had time to think * * * for a minute as well
as an hour or a day, it is deliberate, willful and premeditated ;13O
it is sufficient to constitute the crime if willfulness and delibera-
tion are proven, though they arose and were generated at the
period of the transaction ;140 "premeditatedly" means thought of
135. 106 Wis. at 156-157.
136. See Hedger v. State (1911) 144 Wis. 279, 128 N. W. 80; Zingler v.
State (1911) 146 Wis. 531, 131 N. W. 837; Radej v. State (1913) 152 Wis.
503, 140 N. W. 21.
137. For comprehensive notes on scattered cases see Notes (1880) 18 Am.
Dec. 782; (1905) 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056.
138. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 3982, 3983.
139. State v. Dunn (1853) 18 Mo. 419; State v. Holme (1873) 54 Mo. 153.
140. State v. Starr (1866) 38 Mo. 270.
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beforehand any time however short, 14 1 the court finding no error
in the absence of the word "length" between "any" and "time"
in the instruction; "deliberately" does not mean brooded over,
considered, reflected upon for a week, a day, or an hour, but it
means an intent to kill executed by a party, not under the influ-
ence of violent passion suddenly aroused by some provocation,
but in the furtherance of a formed design to gratify a feeling
of revenge or to accomplish some other unlawful purpose.142
State v. Young' brings all these approved charges down to date
into our era of profound judicial realism. It is evident, therefore,
that Missouri is no more progressive than the states having the
New York type statutes.
A backward-looking glance at Georgia's cases in point reveals
that in 1909 its Supreme Court indorsed a charge reading:
It is not necessary for intention to exist for any length of
time before the killing. In legal contemplation, a man may
form the intention to kill, do the killing instantly, and regret
the deed as soon as it is done. * * * Malice lives in the gleam
of the blade, and in the flash of the pistol; it has not to
exist for any greater length of time than that . 44
The last sentence of the charge was thought to be a bit too
figurative but was nevertheless approved. In 1887 the court de-
clared (and this example is the acme of unreality) that "a mind
swayed by sudden impulse of passion, especially when inflamed
also by whiskey, may resolve, execute and repent almost in the
same moment. A man may form an intent to kill, do the killing
instantly, and regret the deed as soon as done."'145 At the half
century mark the court found that in the absence of provocation
to rise up, draw a pistol, and in one moment discharge its con-
tents, the intention to shoot at the very moment of firing would
amount to a deliberate intention to kill.14 No matter in which
141. State v. Landgraf (1888) 95 Mo. 97, 8 S. W. 237, 6 Am. St. Rep. 26.
142. State v. Fairlamb (1893) 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895, citing State v.
Wieners (1877) 66 Mo. 13; State v. Avery (1892) 113 Mo. 475, 21 S. W.
193; State v. Andrew (1882) 76 Mo. 101; State v. Ellis (1881) 74 Mo. 207,
219.
143. (1926) 314 Mo. 612, 286 S. W. 29.
144. Leonard v. State (1909) 133 Ga. 435, 66 S. E. 251; see also Mills v.
State (1909) 135 Ga. 155, 65 S. E. 368.
145. Weeks v. State (1886) 79 Ga. 36, 3 S. E. 323, 325. See also Bailey
v. State (1883) 70 Ga. 617.
146. Mitchum v. State (1852) 11 Ga. 615; and see Roberts v. State
(1847) 3 Ga. 310, 325.
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sequence the investigator examines the cases, from beginning
to end, or from end to beginning, the result is the same.
Taking a sweeping view of cases wherein the courts have held
that deliberation and premeditation as well for a moment as for
a week or a year will render an intentional killing murder in the
first degree, we find that this variation of the time doctrine pre-
vails in at least fifteen States.147 Nevada courts have held that
the question is not how long did the prisoner deliberate before
giving the fatal stroke, but did he deliberate at all.148 California
allows intent and act to follow "as instantaneous as successive
thoughts of the mind" and holds that no appreciable time be-
tween the formation of the intent and the act need be shown. 4 "
Arkansas holds that mature reflection and deliberation upon the
act of killing are not necessary; there must be deliberation, pre-
meditation, and a formed design to kill, but if they exist, it mat-
ters not how short the time before the killing, it is murder in the
first degree. 5 0 Alabama is on record to the effect that deliberate
and premeditated as used in the statute, mean only this: "that
the slayer must intend, before the blow is delivered, though it
be only an instant of time before, that he will strike at the time
he does strike, and that death will be the result of the blow; or,
in other words, if the slayer had any time to think before the
act, however short such time may have been, even a single mo-
ment, and did think, and he struck the blow as a result of inten-
tion to kill, produced by this even momentary operation of the
mind, and death ensued, that would be a deliberate and premedi-
tated killing."'15' Illinois' high court found sufficient time in "a
short space in which to form the deliberate purpose. 1 1 2 Colorado
requires no particular time ;153 and Idaho, no appreciable length
of time. 54 Montana holds that the intent may be formed a mo-
147. See cases cited Note (1880) 18 Am. Dec. 783.
148. State v. Ah Mook (1877) 12 Nev. 369.
149. People v. Sanchez (1864) 24 Cal. 17, 30; People v. Cotta (1874)
49 Cal. 166; People v. Fleming (1933) 218 Cal. 300, 23 P. (2d) 28; People v.
Garcia (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 673, 42 P. (2d) 1013.
150. McAdams v. State (1869) 25 Ark. 405.
151. Daughdrill v. State (1896) 113 Ala. 7, 32, 21 So. 378.
152. Peri v. People (1872) 65 Ill. 17, 23; see also People v. Newman
(1935) 360 Ill. 226, 195 N. E. 645.
153. People v. Maestas (1932) 91 Colo. 36, 11 P. (2d) 227.
154. State v. Wilson (1925) 41 Idaho 616, 634, 243 Pac. 359.
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ment before the act ;155 and Oklahoma declares that intent may be
formed instantly preceding homicide.-1 6
In the following cases, although the length of the period elaps-
ing between the formation and consummation of the intent to
kill as measured by the time required for the intervening acts
and occurrences, which presumably followed in rapid sequence,
was very brief, it was held sufficient to show premeditation and
deliberation essential to murder in the first degree: Where de-
fendant, after fancied provocation, put on his shoes, arose,
stepped back about two steps, drew his pistol, and shot de-
ceased ;157 where deceased, after having attacked defendant with
an ax but failing to strike him, walked away, and, when about
sixty feet from defendant, the latter stealthily approached, and,
seizing the ax, slew him; 5 8 where defendant, after picking up a
gun, immediately went down a stairway and shot deceased, it
being assumed that the intent to kill was formed after taking
up the gun ;I59 where defendant, upon seeing deceased, a stranger,
walking with his wife, approached and, after some words,
stabbed him ;16o where defendant, after receiving the provocation,
drew a revolver from his pocket with his left hand, transferred
it to his right hand behind his back, and shot deceased ;1" where
defendant, having been ordered off an engine, and having reached
the ground, asked the engineer to hold a light so that he could
find his hat, and, while the engineer was complying with the re-
quest, shot him ;162 where defendant, a patient in a hospital, after
receiving fancied provocation from a nurse, borrowed a knife
from another patient, the latter opening it at his request, and
rapidly followed the nurse and inflicted a fatal wound upon her,
although but ten or twenty seconds elapsed between the first inti-
mation of his purpose and the infliction of the fatal wound;163
where defendant, having made an assault with a heavy cane upon
deceased, and the cane having been taken away by bystanders,
followed the deceased, who was retreating, and, drawing a pistol,
155. State v. Cates (1934) 97 Mont. 173, 33 P. (2d) 578.
156. Basham v. State (1930) 47 Okla. Cr. 204, 287 Pac. 761, 763.
157. McKenzie v. State (1870) 26 Ark. 334.
158. King v. State (1901) 68 Ark. 572, 60 S. W. 951, 82 Am. St. Rep. 307.
159. Dixon v. State (1900) 128 Ala. 54, 29 So. 623.
160. State v. Peffers (1890) 80 Iowa 580, 46 N. W. 662.
161. State v. Daniel (1905) 139 N. C. 549, 51 S. E. 858.
162. State v. Dowden (1896) 118 N. C. 1145, 24 S. E. 722.
163. Commonwealth v. Buccieri (1893) 153 Pa. 535, 26 Atl. 228.
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shot him; 04 where defendant, who was intoxicated, broke down
a door, and dragged deceased from his house, and struck him in
several places with a club ;265 where defendant, having been en-
gaged in a dispute with deceased and been knocked down by him,
turned, arose, walked toward deceased, then turned and walked
back, finally, turning again with his hand behind him, came up
to deceased, and stabbed him with a knife he had concealed in
his hand ;166 where, a dispute having arisen between defendant
and others riding in a wagon which resulted in a scuffle, the de-
fendant, after saying, "Let's quit," jumped from the wagon,
taking with him a bundle, from which he drew a pistol, and shot
deceased. 67
And thus we could go on, extending the foregoing list ad
ncuseam, but no useful purpose would be served thereby. Before
closing this chapter, however, let us see how the federal courts
have construed the law in the relatively few cases that have come
before them relating to the time element.
G. The Federal Courts Speak. Although the crime of murder
is not known as such to the Federal Government, except in places
over which it may exercise exclusive jurisdiction,'"B a number of
cases have reached the federal courts involving the time element.
The Supreme Court is on record to the effect that the intent
necessary to constitute malice aforethought need not have ex-
isted for any particular time before the act of killing, but it may
spring up at the instant and may be inferred from the fact of
killing.169 Strangely, in this case, the high court took note of the
fact that there were some states that required proof of deliberate
premeditation and cited as evidence of this contention People v.
Clark, the New York case that overthrew the high-minded in-
tention of the New York legislature to force a consideration of
the time element. So even the Supreme Court of the United
States has become entangled in the web of confusion that en-
meshes the doctrine and is not above a one-sided approach to the
question.
164. State v. Dennison (1892) 44 La. Ann. 135, 10 So. 599.
165. Commonwealth v. McFall (Pa. 1794) Addison 255.
166. Commonwealth v. Morrison (1899) 193 Pa. 613, 44 Atl. 913.
167. People v. Calton (1888) 5 Utah 451, rev'd on other grounds (1889)
130 U. S. 83.
168. See Pettit v. Walsh (1904) 194 U. S. 205.
169. Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U. S. 492.
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When one considers the instructions that had been given to the
jury in the foregoing federal cases and the indorsement of them
by the Supreme Court, the hopelessness of any judicial ameliora-
tion of the problem, so far as the high court is concerned, if it
follows its own unrealistic precedent, is intensified. Add to this
the rule announced by a lower federal court in a more recent
decision, 110 to the effect that "deliberation and premeditation may
be instantaneous," and you have a placement of the federal courts
with respect to the problem, side by side with the state courts.
III. FIVE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Having demonstrated the unreality of the present approach
to the problem by reference to factual situations, it now behooves
us at least to indicate a number of possible solutions. This we
do in utmost humility, fully cognizant of the difficult nature of
the task and the inadequacy of any solution from certain points
of view. It is one thing to point out a problem and quite another
to solve it. But then, this may be a matter into which academic
"fools" should walk, inasmuch as it seems that judicial "angels"
fear to enter.
A. Reformation of the Judicial Attitude. The first solution sug-
gests itself and is one that has by implication protruded from
these pages like the well-known sore thumb. It is to develop by
a process of education, by public opinion, by more careful ap-
pointive or elective attention to the type of minds that occupy
the bench, by prayer, or by legerdemain, a new and thoroughly
modern attitude on the part of the courts toward the problem.
The step needed is for the legal order to confess that the idea
of pigeon-holing states of mind in applying the murder doctrine
is a product of a bygone age, before there was any subjective
scientific exploration of the thinking process, when judge and
jury, legislator and lawyer assumed, no less than the theologian,
to know the inner workings of the mind under the stress of any
time or tide on the basis of objective reasoning and circumstan-
tial evidence; and that this ancient view is not consistent with
the knowledge we have today of mental phenomena in particular,
however limited that knowledge may be, and of crime causation
factors in general. Even a cursory examination of the trend of
170. Aldridge v. United States (1931) 60 App. D. C. 45, 46, 47 F. (2d)
407, rev'd on other grounds (1931) 283 U. S. 308.
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modern scientific thought will reveal that "the a priori philoso-
phical and theological dogmas long customary in * * * sciences
other than law are gradually surrendering to inductions, hypo-
theses, and 'laws,' which take accurately observed factual data
as their points of departure. So also a shift in emphasis has re-
cently been occurring in jurisprudence-a reorientation from
'immutable principles' (so often prejudiced preconceptions, or
what Freudians call 'wishful thinking'), as axioms for legal rea-
soning, to critical examination of the living stuff of litigation.""'
There are many references to which courts may turn in making
their modus operandi more subjective.1 72 The up-to-date criminal
court, for instance, should be conversant with psychology. No
matter what brand of psychology is espoused by such courts,
findings based thereon will justify the subjective approach. Of
course, this "science," in common with the law, has its champions
of theories, but whether a given court accepts behaviorism or
determinism, Freudian psychology, the instinct theory, or doc-
trines relating to reflex action or emotion in considering the ab-
stractions of intent or the length of time that choice, reflection, or
selection take with respect to particular cases, the net result will
be the same-all of these "brands" of psychology tend to confirm
the validity of the subjective approach. For instance, it is rather
definitely shown by modern psychology that choice or intent may
be influenced by a "slight discoordination between the aim con-
171. Sheldon Glueck, The Social Sciences and the Scientific Method in
the Administration of Justice (1933) 167 Annals 108; see also Cantor, Law
and the Social Sciences (1933) 16 A. B. A. J. 385; Pound, The Call for a
Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697.
172. See, e. g., Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step
(1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 431; Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism (1931)
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222; Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930); Simp-
son, Book Review (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 666; Mechem, The Jurisprudence
of Despair (1936) 21 Iowa L. Rev. 669; see also Fuller, American Legal
Realism (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 429; Kennedy, Principles or Facts(1935) 4 Fordham L. Rev. 53; Sheldon Glueck, A Tentative Program of
Cooperation Between Psychiatrists and Lawyers (1925) 9 Ment. Hyg. 686;
Cantor, Law and the Social Sciences (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 385; Sheldon
Glueck, The Social Sciences and Scientific Method in the Administration of
Justice (1933) 167 Annals 108; Sheldon Glueck, Crime and Justice (1936) ;
Smith, The Psychology of the Criminal (1923); Brasol, The Elements of
Crime (1931) 45; Watson, Psychology from a Standpoint of a Behaviorist(2d ed. 1924); Goodwin, Insanity and the Criminal (1924) 81; McConnell,
Criminal Responsibility (1912); Shaffer, The Psychology of Adjustment(1936) 1; Jung, Collected Papers (2d ed. 1920) 397; Bjerre, The Psychology
of Murder (1927) 7, 8, 9.
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ceived and the physical mode of its execution" ;173 by a disinte-
gration of the will mechanism,"14 by a mild form of neurasthenia
or primary fatigue,175 by hysteria, by emotion, or by any one of
a hundred mental states that fall short of a legal definition of
insanity ;176 by the endocrine system, "which may reduce the in-
dividual ability to remember, to discriminate, and to plan" ;177
by heredity, by anxiety or worry, or by myriad other nervous
conditions; by hunger; by fear; by drunkenness; by "difficulties
of adjustment and errors in habit formation ;118 by environmental
frustrations; by ethnic factors; by personality traits; and, in
short, by all the normal and abnormal, subnormal and super-
normal, factors and strange, perhaps little understood, nuances
of psychic difference which make man what he is and compel
him to be what he ought not to be.
Accredited schools have been offering well patronized courses
in psychology and its sister sciences for many years. Habit clin-
ics, juvenile courts, probation offices, penitentiaries, asylums, de-
linquency clinics, employment agencies, and various other insti-
tutions throughout the land utilize the services of trained psy-
chologists. It is safe to assert that this science is much more
developed than was medical science when the courts first began
to rely on its expert testimony and guidance in criminal cases.
Why then is the law so loath to make changes in its substantive
and procedural structure based on the psychological facts at
hand? Of course, lawyers and courts can always blame the legis-
latures for tying their hands with short-sighted statutory laws,
and this may be a partial explanation of the confusion that exists.
173. Brasol, The Elements of Crime (1931) 336.
174. Ibid.
175. See Shaffer, The Psychology of Adjustment (1936), especially the
chapters on emotion and hysteria.
176. East, Forensic Psychiatry (1927) 86: "From the point of view of
public safety certain high grade defectives may be more dangerous than
the insane, as their mental condition may be more elusive to the uninitiated.
They may be more dangerous than the professional criminal * * * and the
blind impulsive acts which are sometimes committed by defectives may
injure the law abiding citizen who has no opportunity of self-protection
from attack by one who may appear normal to him."
177. Shaffer, op. cit. supra, note 175, c. XII.
178. Shaffer, op. cit. supra, note 175, at 167: "It is probable that all de-
linquency and even adult crime has its origins in difficulties of adjustment
and errors of habit formation. Popular opinion, however, is slow in accept-
ing an objective attitude toward these problems, clinging to a belief in the
individual's free will choice of right or wrong conduct."
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But it is only a partial explanation, and the writer has digressed
here to recognize that fact.
A battalion of great thinkers could be marshalled to support
these views. 179 In the annals of modern legal literature, save for
the pronouncements of writers and jurists "hogtied" by stare
decisis and overly inflexible rules of the court, it would be diffi-
cult to find an advocate of any less liberal philosophy. But the
appalling fact is that all the turmoil and the shouting of this
vanguard of the law have had little effect in reforming the crimi-
nal law in general or the law of homicide in particular.
Homicide law is struggling from within to shake off the in-
consistent growths of old creeds, but with little help from the
outside. It is a hopeful sign, however, that jurists, in increasing
tempo and number, are concerning themselves with "law in ac-
tion" as a fit supplement for "law in books." This is being accom-
plished by reference to the cognate fields of economics, anthro-
pology, sociology, and psychology; and although this concept of
law is yet in its infancy, it is drawing invigorating sustenance
from those allied sciences.
B. Return to Literal Meanings. A second possible solution is
to force a return to the literal meanings of such words as "pre-
meditation," "deliberation," et cetera. Early courts employed
these terms according to their ordinary definitions,"8 0 and there
has been a disposition on the part of many courts of the present
judicial era to recognize the validity of such natural procedure.
Paradoxically, homicide law can, therefore, move forward by
looking backward. By returning for guidance to the era of literal
meanings for the words with which we are concerned, we can
arrive at a more rational and realistic result in our treatment of
spur-of-the-moment intent cases.
C. Revision of Substantive Definitions. The third, and perhaps
most acceptable approach to the problem, if it can be worked out,
is the solution suggested by Mr. Justice Cardozo when he invited
the students of the mind to say whether the distinction in the
New York statutes relating to first and second degree murder
179. A reference to such a list is Professor S. P. Simpson's Outline for
Jurisprudence Seminar (1937-1938, Harvard Law School) pp. 4-11.
180. On this point see Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea(1922) 17 Ill. L. Rev. 117; Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974;
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 Yale L. J.
537.
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had "such substance and soundness that it should be permitted
to survive"-that is, to revise the substantive definition of the
crime of murder.
As to this proposal the Law Revision Commission of New
York insists in its Communication that:
Whatever the solution, the remedial statute must in some
manner attempt to specify a test for selecting capital cases
with reference to the mentality and character of the de-
fendant. The undeveloped state of psychological science in-
creases the difficulty of the task immeasurably, for, to a large
extent, the problem is one of proper terminology, and this
need might have been easily satisfied, were scientific knowl-
edge in this field more highly developed. Nevertheless, the
law need not be thwarted in its desire for more adequate
definition. A closer proximation to the end desired may be
achieved, as long as the goal is clearly understood.181
True, such great criminal lawyers as Wharton are more pessi-
mistic than this, with respect to a satisfactory solution through
revision of the statutes, insisting that "if the sagacity of our
jurists working on this important topic for so long a series of
years has been unable to construct a terse, satisfactory defini-
tion of murder, this is because such a definition cannot, from the
nature of the thing to be defined, be constructed.1,12
In the light of what has been said with respect to the unreality
of thinking through this problem in terms of words only, instead
of in terms of what is known or reasonably inferred by and from
accredited sciences of the mind, and in the light of the assertion,
which we have seen developed in fact, that jurists twist and rede-
fine mere words to conform to their personal predilections, it
would seem that the problem is larger than merely one of proper
terminology; and that although revision of the statutes undoubt-
edly would be a great step in the desired direction, this step alone
will not suffice.
Stephen'"' insists that any new substantive definition of the
crime of murder must remain merely an approximation. The
truth of such a declaration is evident when we stop to consider
the possibility of cases arising which technically fall under the
first degree definition but which actually concern persons whose
181. Communication, p. 88 et seq.
182. 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (1918) sec. 420. And see Judge
Carter's opinion in Cook v. State (1903) 46 Fla. 20, 77, 35 So. 665.
183 3 Stephen, History of Criminal Law of England (1883) 85.
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characters do not warrant comprehension within a definition that
makes their offense a capital one. We have already seen that
despite the wide variation in the statutes, when the different state
courts are faced with the problem, they resolve it in much the
same manner. Whether the statute involved is based upon com-
mon-law terminology, or is of the New York type or the Penn-
sylvania type, or is a combination of these three forms (which
classification is said roughly to categorize all jurisdictional statu-
tory provisionsls4), the general result of the cases is the same.
That this may not be the fault of the lawmakers but of the judges
we have also seen.
Texas tried to solve the problem by leaving first degree murder
undefined except in a sort of residuary definition. But this ap-
proach only defers the problems of definition to second degree
murder and also leads to a revival of the common law rules. In
addition, problems of great difficulty in other respects have been
created by this different statutory attack on the problem in
Texas.185
Draftsmen of a proposed penal code for Germany prior to the
present regime made a proposal similar to the statutes of Texas,
reversing the process followed in New York by describing the
lesser degree of murder and including murder in the first degree
in the residuary definition. In favor of this approach it can be
said only that instead of attempting a description of a state of
mind, it merely requires enumeration of extenuating circum-
stances more easily ascertainable objectively.
Of all the current statutory or code provisions in point ex-
amined by the author, the pertinent section of the Oregon Code
seems least capable of misinterpretation by the courts. It reads
There shall be some other evidence of malice than the mere
proof of the killing to constitute murder in the first degree,
unless the killing was effected in the commission or attempt
to commit a felony; and deliberation and premeditation,
when necessary to constitute murder in the first degree,
shall be evidenced by poisoning, lying in wait, or some other
proof that the design was formed and matured in cool blood,
and not hastily upon the occasion. 86
184. Se Communication, p. 89; compare Michael and Weschler, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 702.
185. See Raymond, Criminal Law-What Constitutes Murder in Texas
(1930) 8 Tex. L. Rev. 391; Comment (1930) 9 Tex. L. Rev. 118.
186. Ore. Code Ann. (1930) sec. 14-214.
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No cases involving the time element were discovered under this
statute. It is not possible, therefore, to draw any conclusions
from the manner in which the statute is working out in practice.
The so-called "functional approach" to the problem is illus-
trated by the Philippine Penal Code of 1932187 and by a proposal
of Edward Livingston made in 1873.188 Such an approach relies
on a rather full description of the "attendant circumstances" un-
der which murder may be committed. The weakness of these
examples is that the first makes "with evident premeditation"
one of the attendant circumstances and the latter includes within
its substantive definition the words "premeditated design," both
of which expressions we have shown to be easily capable of
judicial distortion.
There have been other proposals made for a revision of homi-
cide statutes of particular jurisdictions that are worthy of pass-
ing notice. The Illinois State Bar Association and the Judicial
Advisory Committee of Cook County, for instance, submitted a
Draft Code of Criminal Law and Procedure in 1935, based essen-
tially on common law terminology, Section 18 of which reads:
Murder. (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, in the peace of the people, with malice aforethought,
either expressed or implied. [The unlawful killing may be]
perpetrated [by poisoning, striking, starving, drowning,
stabbing, shooting or] by [other] of the [various forms
or] means by which human [nature] life may be overcome
and death thereby occasioned. Express malice is that de-
liberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a
fellow creature, which is implied when no considerable prov-
ocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.
Pennsylvania's proposed code draftsmen, on the other hand, re-
verted to the type of statute employed by New York in 1860189
in their offering."'
With this brief resume of existing statutes and proposed
changes, we have seemingly run the gamut of contemporaneous
solution possibilities through the medium of positive law. There
187. For full text of the Philippine code provisions, see Communication,
p. 91.
188. 2 Livingston, Complete Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal
Jurisprudence (1873) 147.
189. See text material supported by notes 26, 27, supra.
190. Draft Code of Criminal Law of Pennsylvania (1924) sec. 142,
drafted by Commissioners appointed to revise the Pennsylvania Penal Code.
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is in the light thereof no doubt opportunity for another Bentham,
Field, or Livingston to give the law the benefit of a yet other
definition framed according to the letter of analytical jurispru-
dence but vitalized by a modern sociological spirit.
D. Revision of Punishment Provisions. A fourth possible solu-
tion is to allow the substantive definition provisions of the vari-
ous statutes relating to murder to remain as they are for courts
to contend with and merely to revise the punishment provisions
of the statutes. New York is about to be driven to this extremity.
After seeing its courts torture the intention of the legislators on
several previous occasions when they have focused their humani-
tarian motives on a substantive statutory distinction between
first and second degree murder, recent sessions of the New York
legislature have considered several bills introduced for the pur-
pose of amending the statutory provision relating to punishment
of premeditated and deliberate murders. The proposed legisla-
tion, for the most part, is designed either to eliminate the death
penalty entirely9 1 or to leave with the jury the discretion of in-
voking it and substituting therefor varying terms of imprison-
ment. The obvious purpose of these bills is to accomplish in-
directly what the New York legislature has not been able to ac-
complish directly, namely, to force recognition of the fact that
although some murders have all of the technical aspects of first
degree crimes, morally they may be miles removed and that pun-
ishment should be meted out accordingly. Whether leaving the
matter in the hands of a jury will work out this desired result
is a question that is open to grave doubt.
Some far-sighted state, sooner or later, is going to take the
sentencing function out of the hands of the judge or the jury
entirely and vest it in a board of experts, which may or may not
be an adjunct of the court. This board-which may include a
psychologist or psychiatrist, a judge or lawyer, and a sociologist
191. With respect to the elimination of the death penalty as a solution,
the Communication has this to say at p. 88: "It need merely be reiterated
here that the class of individuals which a first degree murder definition
should seek to encompass are those who, as the result of a reasoned selec-
tion, chose homicide as the means of achieving their end, whether that be
pecuniary gain, solution of marital difficulty, or vengeful satisfaction. It
is against the danger created by such persons that the murder sanction is
directed. If there is any deterrent force in capital penalty, it will be felt
only by those who have time to think and reason, and do think and reason.
The threat of the death penalty is an appeal to reason, the very faculty
that will contemplate the commission of murder."
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-will look not to the crime alone, but upon the criminal as a
human being and not as the object of a capriciously applied law,
and sentence him accordingly. This will be the millennium of the
subjective approach. Until the day comes, if we can't success-
fully revise the definition of the crime of murder, so as to give
it a more subjective aspect, we can at least "make the punish-
ment fit the crime."'192
E. Standardization of State Homicide Laws. A fifth possible
solution, which is rather but an extension of the third or fourth,
is to standardize murder laws among the several states, either
by a slow process of interstate cooperation, through the unifying
influence of a restatement of homicide law, or by means of uni-
form federal homicide legislation, which of course would require
a constitutional amendment. If the several states continue to be
divided in their statutory approach to the solution, unless one or
more of them can happily hit upon a rule that will seize the fancy
and meet the requirements of all, sooner or later there will be an
even wider divergence of judicial decision that will lead to
greater confusion than now exists. On the other hand, if the states
continue to follow blindly in the path of a chosen leader, as Wis-
consin, Florida, Washington, and Minnesota have followed New
York, the law will remain static and confused. From either one
of these viewpoints, and from others that could be mentioned,
there is much to be said in favor of a move toward national uni-
formity of homicide laws.
These solutions by no means exhaust the possibilities. Others
will no doubt occur to every student of the problem. The real
grandeur of the law is always potential. The law always has in
its own fertile soil the seeds of progress and reform. We cannot
hope for reform overnight. But in the meantime if we rest as-
sured that eternal justice has come into full bloom under the sole
aegis of our knowledge and experience from out of the past, we
deceive ourselves . We must not place full faith and credit in in-
stitutions which have no better credentials than their past. The
time is ripe for a complete reexamination and restatement of the
criminal law in the light of modern knowledge and legitimate
192. The Commvn;eation suggests that a combined revision of the sub-
stantive definition of the crime and the punishment provisions might be
worked out. Presumably, such a solution would proceed along the same
lines as we have indicated with respect to either.
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scientific speculation, and of no branch of the criminal law is this
more cogently true than that narrow and yet important branch
which deals with the-trying and taking of men's lives for their
having taken other men's lives.
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